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Abstract
A popular argument against realism rests on the claim that the correspondence theory of 
truth cannot possibly play any significant role in our epistemology (Putnam, Fine) or 
theory of meaning (Dummett, Wright) because of the epistemic gap it opens between 
evidence and truth.
This thesis develops a fallibilist reply to this anti-realist argument and provides 
an assessment of the epistemological consequences one must be prepared to accept if that 
reply is to prove successful.
Chapter 1 attempts to clarify what the issue of realism is about. The ontological, 
epistemological and semantic aspects of realism are sorted out, and the relationship 
between realism about the external world and various theories of truth is explored. 
Endorsement of a correspondence theory of truth (as opposed to an epistemic one) is 
argued to be of great importance to a successful defence of realism about the external 
world, though not identical with it. Chapter 2 argues that commitment to the epistemic 
accessibility of what Putnam calls ‘the God’s eye point of view’ is inessential to the 
correspondence theory of truth. Saying that the goal of our cognitive efforts is to come 
up with sentences which are correspondence-true does not commit one to hold that human 
beings can reach an absolute standpoint from which they can view the world as it is in 
itself and compare it to their own representations. A discussion of the recent debate 
between internalist and externalist epistemologies leads to the proposal of a naturalistic 
view of knowledge according to which knowledge of the things in themselves needn’t be 
knowledge from a God’s eye point of view. Chapter 3 discusses how the rejection of the 
claim of the epistemic accessibility of the God's eye point of view affects the 
epistemological problem of assessing the truth-conduciveness of competing sets of 
methodological rules. The objection that a realism ‘without a God’s eye view' is in fact 
only a concealed form of scepticism is rejected as a legacy of the internalist standpoint 
of traditional epistemology.
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Introduction
What do We Need to Have Epistemic Access To?
The problem of the epistemic accessibility of truth has been one of the major worries of 
modem philosophy, but only in relatively recent times some people have come to suspect 
that the main source of the problem might lie in a poor concept of truth rather than - as 
Descartes and many philosophers after him have thought - in an inadequate methodology. 
If truth appears epistemically inaccessible - so goes the argument - that must be the effect 
of a mistaken concept of what it is for a sentence to be true or false. If a sentence is 
deemed to be true (false) when it corresponds (fails to correspond) to how the world is 
in itself, no wonder that epistemic access to truth will appear quite difficult. For how can 
one possibly know how the world is in itself in the first place, and then compare it with 
one’s own representations? What we really need is not a better methodology, but a better 
notion of truth, that is, an epistemic (or pragmatic) notion of truth1.
I am not impressed by this sort of argument. The most general view underlying 
the present work is that correspondence truth may after all be epistemically more 
accessible than most (reasonable) brands of epistemic truth currently available on the 
philosophical market. If it is possible to show that epistemic access to correspondence 
truth needn’t be so problematic as an exceedingly intellectualistic epistemology would 
have it, the most powerful motivation for accepting an epistemic or pragmatic theory of 
truth will be undermined.
The argumentative strategy explored in this work is to separate commitment to the 
correspondence theory of truth from commitment to the epistemic accessibility of what 
Hilary Putnam calls ‘a God’s eye point of view'. If epistemic access to correspondence
1 Epistemic (or pragmatic) doctrines of truth understand truth as a function of such epistemic (or 
pragmatic) concepts as verifiability, warranted assertability, rational acceptability, etc.
5
truth implies access to a God’s eye view, it can easily be contended that insuperable 
difficulties will prevent human beings from gaining access to correspondence truth. But 
I shall try to argue that we needn’t be commited to an epistemology that makes of the 
epistemic access to an absolute perspective a necessary condition for the pursuit of truth. 
In other words, I shall try to show that, provided we are willing to endorse a naturalistic 
picture of the cognitive activities of human beings, knowledge o f the world as it is in 
itself needn’t be knowledge from the God’s eye point o f view. Hence its achievement may 
prove less arduous than it is usually thought. I propose to explore the implications of the 
idea that epistemic access to correspondence truth is achieved by developing 
representations of reality that correspond to the world as it is in itself, rather than by 
gaining access to an absolute standpoint from which those representations could be 
compared to that world.
To gain access to the Senate House of the University of London is to be allowed 
to enter its building. One needn’t be aware of entering the Senate House to gain access 
to its building. In the present work I shall try to spell out the epistemological 
consequences of the view that epistemic access to the world resembles in significant 
respects physical access to buildings. According to this view, to gain epistemic access to 
the world is just to develop beliefs which are sensitive to how the world is. One can gain 
epistemic access to the world without ever being able to take that absolute perspective 
which could enable one to see if one’s beliefs match the structure of the world.
I oppose the view that epistemic access to reality requires that one’s beliefs be 
justified as true. It is under this view that endorsement of correspondence truth will imply 
either the epistemic accessibility of the God’s eye point of view or surrender to the 
arguments of the sceptic. Facing a similar choice, one may well be tempted to define 
truth epistemically, so that no gap can arise between evidence and truth. But if it can be 
shown that the epistemic gap between evidence and correspondence truth does not 
preclude the epistemic accessibility of truth, then we shall not be confronted with that 
choice in the first place. This does not however rule out that the gap may affect the 
possibility of proving that our beliefs are true.
The problem of a correct characterization of what it is for a sentence to be true 
or false does not merely affect the issue of the epistemic accessibility of truth. It also 
affects the issue of what sort of ‘things’ we can have epistemic access to. I do not believe
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that the traditional controversies between realist and anti-realist philosophers can be 
reduced to controversies between evidence-transcendent and epistemic theories of truth. 
Still, it is a fact that some theories of truth can be more easily combined with a realist 
conception of the objects of knowledge than others. In particular, a successful defence 
that the correspondence theory of truth does not make truth inaccessible will provide 
considerable support for the realist claim that the world we can have epistemic access to 
is not merely a ‘phenomenal’ world (as Kant believed it should be, if human knowledge 
is to be objective), but the world as it is in itself. A successful defence of the 
correspondence theory of truth will thus provide indirect support for the thesis that there 
is a world in itself to which our representations can correspond or fail to correspond.
By providing an argument in defence of the correspondence theory of truth, one 
undermines that train of thought that from acceptance of epistemic truth leads to the belief 
that full-blown realism can no longer be a viable metaphysical option. But precisely to 
what kind of realist mill can my argument, if sound, bring grist?
The way the issue of realism is currently addressed by English-speaking 
philosophers makes it appear as if a very long time has elapsed since J.L. Austin first 
pointed out that it is the negative use of the word ‘real’ that ‘wears the trousers’. By this 
he meant that ‘the function of "real" is not to contribute positively to the characterization 
of anything, but to exclude possible ways of being not real’ (Austin 1962, 70). I do not 
think that philosophers owe a particular allegiance to ordinary language. Provided they 
have some interesting philosophical question to discuss, I cannot see why they should not 
be allowed to use the word ‘real’ as best suits their needs. However, I do think that 
Austin’s remark is valuable advice. Here is a first clue to the kind of realism I shall deal 
with in this work.
The realism I am interested in contradicts the claim that the (only) world we can 
know about, and (hence?) the only world that can exist, is a phenomenal world, a world 
which is constituted by our knowledge. This realism is opposed to that particular brand 
of ‘knowledge-phenomenalism’ which denies that trees, cats, or persons can really exist 
as trees, cats, or persons (and not simply as unknowable things in themselves) 
independently of our knowledge, language, or conceptual schemes. In this philosophical 
sense of ‘real’, there is indeed some common way in which trees, cats, and persons can 
fail to be real: they can all fail to be real entities in the world (as opposed to mere
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phenomenal entities), if they are thought to be constituted as trees, cats, and persons by 
their being actual or potential objects of knowledge2.
If it is possible to resist the conclusion that correspondence truth must be 
epistemically inaccessible by rejecting the claim that epistemic access to correspondence 
truth presupposes epistemic access to the God's eye point of view, it is conceivable that 
trees, cats, and persons can be known by human beings without being constituted by 
human knowledge.
Here is an outline of the structure of the present work. In the first chapter I 
attempt to clarify the relationship between realism and different theories of truth. In this 
chapter I take realism to be a metaphysical doctrine about what there is rather than a 
semantic doctrine about the meaning of certain sets of sentences. I also present what I 
call the anti-realist arguments from the idleness of correspondence truth, and explain why 
a realist unwilling to endorse a deflationary conception of truth ought to reject the claim 
that endorsement of correspondence truth makes it impossible to understand how human 
beings could acquire any knowledge of the world.
In the second chapter I provide an example of the dogmatic epistemology I believe 
a realist needn’t be committed to and present my tentative reply to the claim that 
endorsement of correspondence truth makes it impossible to understand how human 
beings could acquire knowledge of the world. Intemalism and extemalism in the theories
i—
of knowledge and of epistemic justification are dealt with at some lengnt. The claim that 
epistemic justification is not essential to knowledge, but to knowledge claims, provides 
the foundation for a naturalistic view of knowing according to which correspondence truth 
may prove even more accessible than epistemic truth.
In the third chapter I spell out some further epistemological consequences of my 
tentative defence of correspondence truth. I discuss the KK principle (Tf S knows that 
p, then S knows - or at least can know - that she does') and the relevance of the claim 
that ‘One can never know that one knows that p’ for the assessment of competing sets of 
methodological rules. A ‘pragmatic’ view of epistemic justification is put forward as an
2 The ideas of Kant, Kuhn, Goodman, and Putnam illustrate several ways of denying that trees, cats 
and persons may be real parts of the world as it is in itself.
8
attempt to support the thesis that it can be rational to develop and apply criteria of 
epistemic justification which cannot be proved to be truth-conducive.
The last section of the work weighs the pros and cons of the argumentative 
strategy developed in the text and ventures a tentative conclusion about the tenability of 
a realism without a God’s eye view.
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Chapter 1
Realism and Truth
1.1 Is Realism a Doctrine About Meaning?
Realism seems to be a very popular topic among English-speaking philosophers. Many 
different views in such heterogeneous disciplines as metaphysics, epistemology, 
semantics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mathematics are currently 
labelled as ‘realist’ and contrasted with ‘anti-realist’ views. One can hardly see what the 
features shared by those realist and anti-realist views respectively are.
The most influential bid for an overall approach to the various issues raised in 
current (and past) debates about realism is probably that of Michael Dummett. He claims 
to have discovered the common features shared by many different debates commonly 
regarded as involving the issue of realism (Dummett 1978, 45). In his view, the realism- 
nominalism controversy in the theory of universals, the realism-idealism controversy in 
metaphysics, and many other philosophical controversies, like those about the reality of 
the past and the existence of mathematical entities, all are essentially semantic in 
character. Any of these controversies concerns the interpretation to be given to the 
statements in some given class. In each case, the hallmark of realism is endorsement of 
the thesis that statements in the relevant class are determinately either true or false 
independently of our being capable to recognize their truth-value.
If one accepts the widespread belief (which goes back to Frege) that to know the 
meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions under which that sentence is true, a 
consequence of Dummett* s definition is that realism will be committed to a truth-
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conditional theory of meaning where truth is to be conceived as (possibly) evidence* 
transcendent3.
In short, Dummett’s contention is that realism and anti-realism are primarily 
theses about meaning, and only derivatively theses about what there is (Dummett 1978, 
xl). Semantics is regarded as more fundamental than metaphysics. Dummett claims a 
greater generality for his semantic approach, on the ground that it encompasses 
controversies (e.g. about the future and about ethics) which can hardly be construed as 
metaphysical controversies about the existence of entities of a given kind (Dummett 1982, 
55).
Later on, I will say a few words on Dummett’s anti-realist arguments from the 
acquisition and manifestation of linguistic competence. In this section, I only want to 
address the question of the adequacy of his semantic characterization of the realism issue.
Dummett’s definition conflates the issue of realism with the issue of truth. In his 
wake, it has indeed become fairly common in recent years to think of realism as a 
commitment to an evidence-transcendent, absolutist notion of truth (see, e.g., Haack 
1987,276-284). Nevertheless, there appear to be good reasons for keeping the two issues 
clearly distinct.
Dummett remarks that the commitment to an evidence-transcendent notion of truth 
entails the existence, roughly, of a knowledge-independent reality in virtue of which the 
statements in some given class are either true or false (Dummett 1982, 55). This 
entailment is supposed to explain why the doctrine of realism is naturally cashed in 
metaphysical terms. But talk about the existence of some knowledge-independent reality, 
Dummett suggests, is merely metaphorical (Dummett 1978, xxv-xxvi, 229), and can be 
usefully dismissed in favour of his semantic approach.
Two points can be made against Dummett’s contention. First, metaphysical talk 
of a knowledge-independent reality appears perfectly meaningful in its own right, and not 
parasitic upon semantic talk as Dummett suggests. Second, the semantic thesis about the 
evidence-transcendence of truth and the metaphysical thesis about the existence of a
3 A conception of truth is said to be evidence-transcendent when it places some or all of die 
sentences of our language beyond our capacity to recognize whether they are true or false, hi other words, 
endorsement of an evidence-transcendent notion of truth means commitment to count as true-or-false even 
those sentences whose tmth-values we have no way of settling.
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knowledge-independent reality are logically independent: the former does not entail the 
latter, nor the latter entails the former.
As for the first point, Dummett himself has often presented his anti-realism as a 
generalisation of mathematical intuitionism. Thus Michael Devitt is likely to be right 
when he points out that Dummett’s thesis on the metaphorical character of metaphysical 
talk about reality arises from his philosophy of mathematics (Devitt 1991, 264-266). In 
that particular field, it may be sensible to suppose that platonic talk about mathematical 
objects is purely metaphorical, as the real problem appears to be, in Kreisel’s words, ’not 
the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical statements’ 
(quoted in Dummett 1978, xxviii). However, there is no reason to believe that 
metaphysical talk about the existence of physical bodies should inherit the supposed 
metaphorical character of platonic talk about mathematical entities. After all, physical 
bodies, unlike platonic entities, can bring about causal effects on human beings!
The thesis that metaphysical talk about the existence of a knowledge-independent 
world is not to be taken as parasitic upon the semantic talk about the interpretation of the 
statements in some given class is further supported by our second point. In effect, if the 
semantic and the metaphysical theses about realism are logically independent, that will 
mean that the former enables us to say things that are not expressed by the latter.
Does the evidence-transcendence of truth entail the existence of a knowledge- 
independent world? Apparently it doesn’t. For one can think of a version of coherentism 
according to which truth is in a strong sense evidence-transcendent without this implying 
the existence of a knowledge-independent world4.
Does the existence of a knowledge-independent world entail the evidence- 
transcendence of truth? Surely it doesn’t, for one can easily conjoin the metaphysical 
thesis about the existence of a knowledge-independent world with a deflationary 
(disquotational) theory of truth. And a deflationary theory of truth needn’t say anything
4 For such a version of coherentism, see Dancy 1985, 138 f.: if the notion of a ‘fully coherent set 
of propositions* is construed in a suitably idealized form, so that ‘at any time, or tunelessly, there is, for 
each set [of propositions], a larger and more coherent set*, then ‘for any such set, no matter how large, 
there remains the possibility that it is false*.
But note that Dancy identifies commitment to the existence of evidence-transcendent truths with 
realism (Dancy 1985, 19), and thus takes his epistemology to provide a realist version of coherentism. 
However, Dancy’s coherentism needn't come out as a realist position on the basis of a non-semantic 
characterisation of realism and anti-realism as the one I am trying to defend.
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at all about the problem of the epistemic accessibility of truth (compare Devitt 1991, 41 
and Grayling 1992, 52). Alternatively, one could adopt some form of dogmatic 
epistemology involving the claim that we have immediate, intuitive access to some set of 
axiomatic truths, and demonstrative knowledge of their consequences. If the information 
so acquired is adequately comprehensive, such a dogmatic epistemology will be consistent 
with the metaphysical thesis of the existence of a knowledge-independent world without 
being committed to the possibility of evidence-transcendent truths.
If these arguments are sound, then there seems to be a logically independent, 
metaphysical thesis, that Dummett’s semantic approach cannot possibly capture. True, 
some philosophical positions which are classifiable as realist on the basis of Dummett’s 
criterion turn out to be totally independent of any such metaphysical thesis. Shall we say 
that the metaphysical thesis is not essential to realism? Anthony Grayling sensibly 
suggests that (what we should say about those "realisms" which are not readily 
classifiable in terms of some reality or realm of entities is, simply, [...] that they are not 
realisms* (Grayling 1992, 54).
So there appears to be some point in trying to devise a precise formulation of the 
metaphysical thesis of realism as distinct from the semantic thesis of the evidence- 
transcendence of truth, if only to spell out in greater detail how these theses are related 
to each other.
1.2 Commonsense, Scientific, and External World Realism
In the next three paragraphs, we shall focus our attention on the metaphysical thesis of 
realism in its utmost generality. However, it’s now time to make clear that what I am 
ultimately concerned with is the traditional thesis of external world realism. The 
following characterization of the general thesis of realism is thus to be seen as a first step 
towards an appropriate definition of the more specific claim of external world realism.
Devitt points out that the metaphysical thesis of realism implies two kinds of 
claims: independence claims and existence claims (Devitt 1991, 14-22). He then 
characterizes the first kind of claims as claims about the knowledge- and mind- 
independence of those entities which are said to exist (he actually says claims about the
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‘objectivity’ and the ‘non-mental’ character of those entities). He builds the mind- 
independence requirement into the independence claim because he is exclusively 
concerned with the reality of the external, physical world. That’s what I am also 
primarily interested in. But in defining the metaphysical thesis of realism, one needn’t 
confine oneself from the beginning to external world realism. Thus, I propose to say that 
the metaphysical doctrine of realism makes an ontological claim about what entities exist 
and an epistemological claim about their independence from anybody’s knowledge of 
them5.
The epistemological claim is indeed essential to realism: those entities which are 
asserted to exist must exist independently of any actual or possible knowledge of them. 
They needn’t be epistemically accessible to anyone (empirical, trascendental or godlike 
subject) in order to exist - which is not to say that they cannot be. (Of course artifacts 
owe their forms to their manufacturers’ knowledge, as well as some kind of knowledge- 
dependence is involved in the existence of tools and social entities; but neither artifacts, 
nor tools or social entitities, bear an epistemological dependence on the knowledge of 
their knowers6).
The ontological claim specifies what kind of entities are supposed to exist. Devitt 
notes that for a person who rejects, as several philosophers are today inclined to do, both 
the ‘incorrigibility thesis’ and the ‘self-intimation thesis’ about the mental7, the question 
whether or not a mental event exists will be an altogether objective question (Devitt 1991, 
15). According to our proposal, if such a person does believe in the existence of mental 
events, as far as these events are concerned she will be classified as a realist. External
5 Another reason why I prefer talk of knowledge-independence to (the once more common) talk of 
mind-independence is that one may envisage cases of knowledge-dependence which are not, strictly 
speaking, cases of mind-dependence. Instinctive behavioural dispositions programmed by natural selection 
in the nervous system of several lands of living creatures and formal constraints ascribed by neo-kantian 
philosophers to transcendental subjects of a very abstract and impersonal sent may give rise to instances 
of knowledge-dependence which are only in a very loose sense instances of mind-dependence.
6 The kind of knowledge-dependence die realist wants to deny has nothing to do with the trivial 
causal relations by which such mental states as beliefs and desires can affect die physical world. What she 
wants to deny is rather that kind of epistemological knowledge-dependence where die knowing subject 
constitutes the object of her knowledge and can have epistemic access only to such a phenomenal object 
as opposed to the object as it is in itself.
7 The ‘incorrigibility thesis* is that a person cannot be wrong about, and the ‘self-intimation thesis* 
that she cannot be ignorant of, her own mental states.
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world realism will require a further step, that is, the assertion that entities o f a non­
mental kind exist.
Speaking of the knowledge-independent existence of entities of a non-mental kind 
is of course very vague: ‘This commits realism only to an undifferentiated, uncategorised, 
external world, a Kantian "thing-in-itself" ’ (Devitt 1991, 17). An external world realist 
will want to commit herself to more than that. To provide a suitable definition for 
something like common-sense or scientific realism, one needs to be more specific about 
the kinds of entities one claims to exist. These cannot be mere Kantian noumena. Beware: 
I am not saying that common-sense or scientific realism entail any particular claim about 
the epistemic accessibility of reality. I am just saying that they are committed to the 
knowledge-independent existence of entities which are not Kantian noumena. If one is a 
realist about trees, all that one is committed to is the truth of the statement:
(Ex)(Tx & ((t)(iEy)(Kyxt) U+ Tx))
where ‘Tx* stands for *x is a tree', ‘Kyxt’ stands for ‘y knows at t that x is a tree’, and 
the box-arrow symbolises the subjunctive conditional Tf it were the case that..., then it 
would be the case that...'. (To be sure, one should also specify at what time the entities 
in question are claimed to exist; but for our purposes we can omit such details).
Making that statement, one doesn’t say anything about one’s grounds for making 
it or the epistemic accessibility of trees (although making that statement may implicate 
the commitment to provide some justification for its utterance). In particular, one does 
not say that she is always, mostly, or usually right about what she takes to be trees8. 
Realism as I am trying to define it entails an epistemological claim about the knowledge- 
independence of the entities which are said to exist, but leaves completely unsettled the 
question of their accessibility to human knowledge.
It is clear that we cannot phrase realism about chairs, paintings and poems as we 
have phrased realism about trees: the existence of such things presupposes the existence 
of their manufacturers. However, in order to avoid unneccessary complications, I will
1 This is clearly incompatible with those theories of meaning which make successful reference 
depend upon the correctness of our beliefs about die object in question. But today we have viable 
alternatives to such theories (see, e.g., Putnam 1975).
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restrict my definitions of common-sense and scientific realism to what we might call 
‘natural kinds’ (though I am aware that several scientific ‘phenomena’ are human 
products in a very close sense to tables and chairs; but see note 3 above). I don’t think 
this restriction can significantly affect the ensuing arguments. After all, what I am mainly 
concerned with is external world realism in general, not realism about social or cultural 
wholes such as institutions or text-meanings.
This is how I propose to understand the doctrines of common-sense and scientific 
realism:
Common-Sense Realism: Tokens of most current common-sense physical types 
exist independently of anybody’s knowledge of them.
Scientific Realism: Tokens of most current unobservable scientific physical types 
exist independently of anybody’s knowledge of them.
These definitions are modelled on those of Devitt (1991, 24), but the independence 
requirement is here purely epistemological. For economical reasons, they involve 
quantification over types, but this is not an essential feature of them (see Devitt 1991, 20 
f.).
External world realism can be identified either with common-sense realism or with 
the conjunction of common-sense and scientific realism9. We may agree to call ‘modest’ 
external world realism the former version, and ‘comprehensive’ external world realism 
the latter. In what follows, I shall confine my arguments to the modest version, which 
can be more easily defended (or so it appears to me). Whenever I speak of ‘external 
world realism’, the phrase should be understood as referring to the modest version. 
Indeed, I shall mostly write ‘Realism’, sic et simpliciter, with the capital *R’, as a 
shorthand for ‘external world realism’.
9 Grover Maxwell and Wilfrid Sellars have argued that common-sense and scientific realism are 
in fact incompatible and die former should give way to the latter. I think there is a plurality of descriptive 
levels at which reality can legitimately be depicted, any of them possessing a peculiar explanatory role in 
our picture of the world. But I won’t argue this point, because it is completely inessential to my purposes.
16
1.3 Scientific Realism and Correspondence Truth
What can be said about our proposed definitions? It will be convenient to start from 
scientific realism, which has been the focus of extensive debate in recent years.
According to W.H. Newton-Smith, the word ‘realism’ has been used ‘to cover a 
multitude of positions in the philosophy of science, all of which, however, involve the 
assumption that scientific propositions are true or false where truth is understood in terms 
of a cleaned-up version of the correspondence theory of truth’ (Newton-Smith 1981, 28 
f.). A cleaned-up version of the correspondence theory of truth is characterized by 
Newton-Smith as the claim that ‘to be true (false) is to be true (false) in virtue of how 
the world is independently of ourselves’ (Newton-Smith 1981, 29). I wouldn’t say, as 
Newton-Smith does, that all the different versions of scientific realism which have been 
proposed in recent years involve the acceptance of some sort of correspondence theory 
of truth. It is true, however, that many of them do, and it is also true that many of them 
draw their deeper inspiration precisely from that acceptance.
Another claim which currently goes under the label of ‘scientific realism' is the 
claim that ‘the historically generated sequence of theories of a mature science is a 
sequence of theories which are improving in regard to how approximately true they are’ 
(Newton-Smith 1981, 39). Talk of ‘convergent’ or ‘cumulative’ realism hints at this 
feature of scientific realism.
Apparently, then, the content of our definition of scientific realism is much 
narrower than one would be likely to expect on the basis of the current debate. Ought we 
to have built the semantic thesis about the nature of truth and the epistemological thesis 
about the increasing verisimilitude of successor theories in mature science into our 
concept of scientific realism? I believe we do well not to.
Obviously, anybody is free to define scientific realism as they like best: nothing 
hangs on the labels we attach to our concepts. Yet, I prefer to treat (1) the ontological 
claim about the knowledge-independent existence of the unobservables posits of science, 
(2) the correspondence theory of truth, and (3) the convergency thesis as separate issues. 
Even if it is true that (1), (2), and (3) appear to many philosophers as the elements of a 
whole, cogent picture (see, e.g., Popper 1963, ch. 10, and Newton-Smith 1981, 28-43), 
nevertheless they are logically independent, and an increasing number of self-declared
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scientific realists would not be prepared to accept them all. Brian Ellis, for example, has 
argued that ‘scientific realism is incompatible with any form of the correspondence theory 
of truth’ (Ellis 1990, 160 f.), because the ontology of science cannot possibly 
accommodate the entities to which that theory assigns the role of the bearers of truth 
(Ellis 1990, ch. 5). In the opposite camp, Bas van Fraassen, whose ‘constructive 
empiricism’ provides one of the most compelling forms of anti-realism currently 
available, appears non-equivocally committed to the correspondence theory of truth (van 
Fraassen 1980, 90, 197). Indeed, were it not for his commitment to the correspondence 
theory of truth, his argument could not even establish its point.
I am ready to admit that scientific realism as I have proposed to define it, that is, 
as a purely metaphysical claim, is not a very interesting position. While Realism would 
be an interesting thesis even if our singular claims about the tokens which fall under the 
kinds we take to be instantiated in the furniture of the world were mostly wrong, the 
same is not true when applied to scientific realism. If there were in fact a few knowledge- 
independent electrons around, but the singular claims about electrons implied by our 
present scientific information were mostly wrong, then our scientific knowledge would 
be remarkably poor. So I am keen to concede that any interesting formulation of 
scientific realism will have to involve a claim about the approximate correctness of our 
theoretical picture of electrons (or, as Ian Hacking has suggested, about our knowing how 
to use electrons to bring about various kinds of physical phenomena). That is not to say, 
however, that any interesting formulation of scientific realism will have to consist in 
some sort of convergent realism. The statement that the singular claims implied by our 
present scientific information are largely correct will satisfactorily do the job. Popper’s 
original ‘conjectural realism’ (see Worrall 1989, 110 f.) provides an example of a 
resolute (if somehow qualified) scientific realism not committed to the increasing 
verisimilitude of the theories of mature science.
What I am most interested in, though, is a clear distinction between (1) and (2). 
In section 1.1 ,1 argued that one is allowed to formulate non-metaphorical and perfectly 
meaningful metaphysical theses about what there is. What I now want to emphasise is that 
current arguments in favour of scientific realism do not provide any grounds to believe 
that our formulation of its ontological claim is hollow unless it is supplemented by the
18
acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth. Our next step will be an exploration 
of the links between Realism and different theories of truth.
1.4 Externa! World Realism and Truth
External world realism is usually taken to bear a privileged relationship to the 
correspondence theory of truth. So here is my definition of correspondence truth, which 
is a variant of Devitt’s definition (see Devitt 1991, 29):
Correspondence Truth: Sentences of type X are true or false in virtue of: (1) their 
structure; (2) the referential relations between their parts and reality; (3) how 
reality is independently of anybody’s knowledge10.
I wish to emphasise that this definition does not require that the sentences in question 
‘mirror*, or ‘picture’, or be somehow ‘isomorphic’ to, the bit of reality they purport to 
represent.
Several contemporary upholders of correspondence truth are convinced that 
Tarski’s semantic definition has succeeded in rehabilitating the traditional view of truth 
as correspondence (see, e.g., Popper 1963, 223 f. and Zahar 1984, 165). This is 
controversial, and Tarski’s own remark that ‘we may accept the semantic conception of 
truth without giving up any epistemological attitude we may have had; we may remain 
naive realists, critical realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians - whatever we 
were before’ (Tarski 1944, 362) is frequently taken to undermine that conviction.
If we stick to a clear distinction between the metaphysical issue of what there is 
and the epistemological issue of the nature of truth, Tarski’s definition is indeed 
ontologically neutral, but nevertheless provides some form of support for 
correspondentism. It is true that Tarski’s definition does not specify what kinds of entities
10 Of course there is a sense in which ‘how reality is* depends on somebody's knowledge. If S 
knows that p, then *p* is true, then p. But saying on this basis that how reality is depends on somebody's 
knowledge would be like saying that the pressure depends on the barometer reading.
Perhaps I should also specify that when I write that 'how reality is* must be independent of 
anybody's knowledge, I take that to mean that it must be independent from die knowledge of any empirical, 
transcendental, idealized, or God-like subject.
must exist so that the truth-value of the sentences in our formalized language may be 
determined. Thus Tarski’s definition is compatible with different ontologies (e.g., with 
phenomenalism), and does not require the existence of an external, physical world. But 
it is equally true that satisfaction is a semantic relation obtaining (or failing to obtain) 
between open sentences and sequences of objects. I f the objects involved are understood 
as knowledge-independent, then Tarski’s definition provides a perfectly clear sense of 
how a sentence in a formalized language can correspond to reality11. So Tarski’s 
definition may be construed as a version of the correspondence theory of truth, even if 
it doesn’t necessarily need to.
However, the claim that Tarski’s definition provides significant support for the 
correspondence theory of truth ought not to be misunderstood. First, it does not entail 
the further claim that the facts described by the sentences on the right-hand-side of any 
given (T) schema are the knowledge-independent entities that make the sentences named 
on the left-hand-side either true or false. Hence, it does not support the thesis that a 
sentence is true iff there is some knowledge-independent fact to which it is isomorphic. 
But that thesis is not part of our definition of correspondence truth. Indeed, for someone 
upholding correspondence truth, facts needn’t even be conceived as knowledge- 
independent (I believe they should be conceived as being, at least in part, linguistic 
constructs. In my opinion, facts supervene on reality under a linguistic description. For 
this reason, I prefer to say that a sentence is true iff it corresponds to reality, or iff it
11 The fact that 'satisfaction' is prima facie a semantic notion is the source of some trouble for the 
attempt to attach philosophical significance to Tarski's definition of truth.
Can the objects in the sequences be understood as knowledge-independent? It has been pointed out 
that Tarski's enumerative definition of satisfaction for atomic open sentences fails to provide a truly general 
definition of satisfaction, as opposed, say, to different definitions for satisfaction-in-Lj, satisfaction-in-Lj, 
etc. Tarski’s definition may thus appear to embody an inadequately analysed semantic primitive, whose 
presence may be seen as casting doubts upon Tarski's own claim of providing a philosophically 
unobjectionable analysis of something like ‘the classical Aristotelian conception of truth’ (Tarski 1944,342). 
Hartry Field has argued that Tarski's definition must be complemented by a physicalist theory of reference 
if it is to give a satisfactory explanation of the connection between language and (extralinguistic) reality (see 
Field 1972).
To my mind, it is true that the lack of a detailed theory of reference showing how language may 
latch on to a knowledge-independent reality may encourage people with anti-realist leanings to think that 
reference is always internal to our conceptual schemes. But the Realist cannot be forced to give up his 
(commonsensical) idea that names refer to knowledge-independent objects on the sole basis that she has not 
yet provided a fully worked-out theory of how that may happen. So Tarski's theory of truth does help to 
clarify how a sentence in a formalised language can correspond to reality, even though it does not clarify 
how an object can satisfy a predicate.
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corresponds to how the world is, and not iff it corresponds to the facts. That is not to say 
that a sentence cannot fail to correspond to the facts; but that failure will be just a 
consequence of its failure to correspond to reality).
One ought not to overestimate the epistemological relevance of Tarski’s definition 
either. For indeed that definition provides a compelling analysis of what it is for a 
sentence in a formalized language to be true or false, but it doesn’t say anything at all 
about the problem of the epistemic accessibility of truth. And this very problem has been 
the focus of many recent attacks against the correspondence notion of truth, attacks which 
deny the epistemological relevance of the notion, rather than its formal correctness. The 
development and assessment of a counter-argument aimed at the rejection of precisely this 
sort of epistemological attack will provide one of the major focuses of the present work.
But let’s go back to our problem: What are the links between Realism and 
different theories of truth? First of all, note that the issues of Realism and truth appear 
logically independent from each other. Take the case of correspondence truth, which is 
the most likely candidate to a close relationship with Realism. (Note that correspondence 
truth is not synonymous with evidence-transcendent truth. As we remarked before, there 
can be versions of coherentism according to which truth is in a strong sense evidence- 
transcendent, but a coherentist account of truth is certainly not a correspondence one). 
Does Realism entail the correspondence theory of truth? According to our definition, it’s 
clear that it doesn’t. As for the converse entailment, we have already seen that Tarski’s 
theory is ontologically neutral, even if it does lend some form of support to the 
correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory of truth, in turn, entails some 
form of realism, but not necessarily external world realism. A phenomenalist who 
rejected the incorrigibility and the self-intimation theses could subscribe to the 
correspondence theory of truth.
So we shall have to look for weaker links. Devitt has suggested that an abductive 
argument can be devised from Realism to correspondence truth. In short, his point is that 
‘from a Realist perspective, we need truth to explain the properties of symbols that enable 
them to play their wide variety of social roles’ (Devitt 1991, 44; the argument is spelled 
out in detail in ch. 6). Devitt’s argument is highly controversial, and for any sympathy 
I may have for it, I won’t strive to defend it in these pages. On the contrary, I will dwell
21
on the other abductive argument to which Devitt draws our attention, the argument from 
epistemic truth to anti-realism (see Devitt 1991, 44 f.).
For explanatory purposes, an epistemic theory of truth can be contrasted with an 
absolutist one. An absolutist theory of truth maintains that the truth-value of a given 
statement is altogether independent of anybody’s epistemic situation and thus a completely 
objective matter. On the contrary, an epistemic theory will maintain that truth is always 
a function of some epistemic concept, such as, for example, verifiability, rational 
acceptability, warranted assertability, and so on. A recent example of an epistemic 
definition of truth is provided by Hilary Putnam, who has defined truth as an idealization 
of rational acceptability, claiming that true is what would be rational to accept in an ideal 
epistemic situation (Putnam 1981, ch. 312; but the idea goes back at least to Peirce13).
Devitt argues that the closest link between the epistemic doctrines of truth and 
Realism is displayed by an application of Tarski’s material requirement. His abductive 
argument from epistemic truth to anti-realism goes as follows. Assuming that any 
acceptable definition of truth should have as a consequence all instances of the (T) 
schema, then, if (TE’ stands for ‘true as defined by the epistemic doctrine E', E will 
require that the appropriate instances of
S is Tb iff p 
hold. For example:
‘Caesar had five moles’ is TB iff Caesar had five moles
13 Nobody aware of die fluidity of Putnam’s thought will be surprised to hear that he has recently 
modified this position by suggesting that not only truth depends on rational acceptability, but rational 
acceptability depends on truth: ‘whether an epistemic situation is any good or not typically depends on 
whether many different statements are true* (Putnam 1988, 115). Putnam claims that this is precisely what 
he had in mind when he wrote Reason, Truth and History, though the textual evidence shows that this is 
not what he wrote.
13 To be sure, Peirce also thought that scientific method is somehow constrained by reality, and 
hence cannot be read as abandoning correspondence truth altogether.
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But why should such instances of our modified (T) schema hold? Devitt invites us to 
consider an extravagant version of epistemic theory of truth: TE = is affirmed by the 
Pope. Why should
‘Caesar had five moles’ is affirmed by the Pope iff Caesar had five moles
hold? An explanation can only be provided by some epistemological doctrine. We could 
say, for example, that the world is created by the Pope’s word, or that the Pope enjoys 
some infallible insight of a divine origin into how the world is. These two answers lead 
to different attitudes about the knowledge-independent existence of the external world, 
respectively an anti-realist and a realist one. The epistemic doctrine that ‘to be true is to 
be affirmed by the Pope’ has some bearing on the issue of realism only via some 
epistemological theory. But while in the case of our papist doctrine we can imagine that 
some neo-scholastic philosopher may find the epistemological theory that leads to Realism 
more attractive than the epistemological theory that leads to a Pope-creator, in the case 
of the epistemic doctrines currently advanced in the epistemological circles the situation 
is, for any sort of philosopher, completely reversed:
The problem which the epistemic doctrine poses for the Realist is that it is hard 
to find a plausible Realist epistemology to do the explanatory job for most, if not 
all, the likely candidates to be TB.
(Devitt 1991, 45)
If, for example, TB were to be construed in terms of warranted assertability, the external 
world realist could hardly devise an explanation of the incredibly close link between a 
state of the world, Caesar having five moles, and our being warranted in asserting 
‘Caesar had five moles’, that the epistemic doctrine in question would commit her to. For 
which epistemological doctrine assuming the knowledge-independence of the external 
world could ever explain why those statements which are warrantedly assertible are 
infallibly true? And surely the external world realist couldn’t do any better when 
confronted with other epistemic versions of truth.
In sum, even if epistemic truth does not logically imply the denial of the existence 
of the external world, it is nevertheless likely to lead to anti-Realism for lack of viable
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epistemological explanations of why the (T) schemas that follow from a particular choice 
of Tb should hold on the basis of a realist view of the external world.
The strong appeal of what Devitt calls the abductive argument from epistemic 
truth to anti-Realism helps to explain why the issues of Realism and truth are so 
frequently conflated in current philosophical reflection. Acceptance of an epistemic 
doctrine of truth provides a strong motivation for the rejection of Realism. Given the 
minor popularity enjoyed by the deflationary (or redundancy, or disquotational) account 
of truth (but see the forceful defence of the ‘minimalist’ doctrine in Horwich 1990), many 
philosophers feel as if they are forced to pick out just one of the two following options: 
either Realism + correspondence truth or anti-Realism + epistemic truth. It takes just 
a further, little step to suppose that Realism and anti-Realism are in fact doctrines about 
the nature of truth. Which is false, but nevertheless contains a grain of truth. Put in a 
nutshell: if one wants to be a Realist but is not willing to endorse a deflationary account 
of truth, she had better prepare herself to defend the correspondence theory of truth from 
the attacks of the advocates of the epistemic doctrines.
1.5 Correspondence Truth and the God’s Eye Point of View
‘How can I see that my knowledge corresponds with the object? - 1 only can compare the 
object to the extent I know it. I only can compare knowledge of the object with other 
knowledge of the same object’. This passage from Kant (quoted in Bonsack 1989, 80) 
provides a nice example of the sort of convictions underlying most current epistemic 
attacks cm the correspondence theory of truth. Kant himself did not go so far as to reject 
correspondence truth explicitly (see Kant 1933, 97), yet his epistemology is clearly 
incompatible with any notion that could satisfy our third requirement for correspondence 
truth, because his phenomenal world (that is, the only world epistemically accessible to 
the human beings) is structured by the categories of the Understanding.
Present-day heirs of Kant usually provide a motivation and an argument in support 
of their rejection of correspondence truth. While the argument is developed in different 
forms, the motivation is pretty much the same in all cases. Critics of correspondence 
truth are invariably prompted by the desire to bridge the epistemic gap between evidence
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and truth they take as a consequence of the correspondence theory of truth. Actually, the 
correspondence theory of truth does not entail, by itself, any claim about the epistemic 
accessibility of truth. Correspondence truth supplemented by a dogmatic epistemology 
like that sketched in section 1.1, for example, does not imply any epistemic gap at all 
between evidence and truth. There can be no doubt, however, that correspondence truth 
makes an epistemic gap between evidence and truth at least possible. But while upholders 
of correspondence truth address the problem of that gap only after their notion of truth 
is already in place, upholders of epistemic doctrines build the solution to the problem into 
their definition of truth from the outset.
Even if the arguments purporting to rebut correspondence truth exhibit a great 
variety of formulations, most of them draw on a basic idea which is shared by all their 
proponents. Put bluntly, this is the conviction that a concept which is forever going to 
transcend our capacity of rational recognition is idle, and cannot play any significant role 
in our epistemology or in any other part of our cognitive picture. It goes without saying 
that the rejection of correspondence truth is normally prompted by the belief that the 
notion of a correspondence between linguistic entities and reality must indeed be such a 
concept, because of the epistemic gap it makes possible between evidence and truth.
Two well-known versions of the argument from the idleness of correspondence 
truth are those developed by Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam.
Dummett’s argument from the acquisition and manifestation of linguistic 
competence purports to show that no truth-conditional theory of meaning committed to 
the existence of recognition-transcendent truths will succeed in providing an adequate 
account of the propositional knowledge implicitly possessed by the speakers of some 
language L (see Dummett 1976). Anyone accepting Dummett’s semantic characterization 
of the realism/anti-realism debate will regard his argument, if successful, as an immediate 
refutation of realism. But Dummett’s argument doesn’t require that the semantic approach 
be accepted to establish its point. For its thrust is that acceptance of an evidence- 
transcendent notion of truth prevents the formulation of an acceptable theory of meaning. 
So, if Dummett is right, we shall be compelled to give up correspondence truth14, 
endorse epistemic truth, and accept Devitt’s abduction from epistemic truth to anti-
14 Unless we are prepared to subscribe to a dogmatic epistemology capable of mailing 
correspondence truth generally accessible to human cognitive subjects.
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Realism. However, it should be noted that the rejection of the semantic approach has the 
effect of restoring the issue of the evidence-transcendence of truth to its natural place, 
i.e., epistemological theory. Whether the possibility of an epistemic gap between 
evidence and truth allowed by correspondence truth has any relevance for the possibility 
of a theory of meaning cannot be determined by our theory of truth alone: an answer to 
the question requires the decisive contribution of epistemological theory. In other terms: 
while acceptance of correspondence truth implies commitment to the possibility of truth 
transcending evidence, only acceptance of an epistemological theory will imply 
commitment to a definite view of the relationship between evidence and truth, which is 
what actually affects the construction of a theory of meaning.
Dummett claims that no account of the manifestation and acquisition of linguistic 
competence can possibly be developed on the basis of a recognition-transcendent notion 
of truth. Acquisition of linguistic competence presupposes its manifestation: nobody could 
learn to speak a language if what speakers know in knowing their language were not 
publicly observable, hence acquirable in public contexts. But
if truth-value is construed as a possibly recognition-transcendent property of 
sentences, as in the realist view it is, then what account is to be given of what it 
is to know the truth-conditions of sentences whose truth-values we are not able 
to establish? It is plainly impossible to associate grasp of the transcendent truth- 
conditions of certain sentences with the possession of an ability to recognise what 
their truth-values are, precisely because their truth-conditions are transcendent. 
For such sentences, then, we have no way of saying how knowledge of their 
truth-conditions can be manifested. But if we cannot say this, the theory does not 
show how sense and use connect - how, that is, sense and use determine each 
other. Accordingly any theory of meaning based on a transcendent concept, as in 
the case of a realist theory of meaning, is useless.
(Grayling 1990, 235)
Dummett’s argument can be construed as an argument ‘from the idleness of 
correspondence truth’ because it claims that an evidence-transcendent notion of truth 
(such as correspondence truth turns out to be, if it is not complemented by a dogmatic 
epistemology) cannot give any contribution to our understanding of how linguistic 
competence is manifested and acquired. Any appeal to that notion made by truth- 
conditional theories of meaning is thus to be regarded as completely otiose.
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If we do not readily accept this conclusion, Dummett urges, it is because we 
convince ourselves that understanding of the truth-conditions of undecidable sentences 
consists in our grasp of what the ability of using such sentences to give direct reports of 
observation would be for someone who had epistemic access to the God's eye point of 
view:
We cannot do this; but we know just what powers a superhuman observer would 
have to have in order to be able to do it - a hypothetical being for whom the 
sentences in question would not be undecidable.
(Dummett 1976, 99)
The idea is forcefully conveyed in the course of Dummett’s attack against realism about 
the past (which is rendered as the claim that any arbitrary statement about the past is 
determinately true or false independently of our present, future, or possible knowledge 
of its truth-value):
What the realist would like to do is to stand in thought outside the whole temporal 
process and describe the world from a point which has no temporal position at all, 
but surveys all temporal positions in a single glance [...] The anti-realist takes 
more seriously the fact that we are immersed in time: being so immersed, we 
cannot frame any description of the world as it would appear to one who was not 
in time, but we can only describe it as it is, i.e., as it is now.
(Dummett 1978, 369)
Such reflexions lead Dummett to suggest that ultimately ‘realism is tenable only on a 
theistic basis’ (Dummett 1978, xxxix).
In the present work, I won’t produce a detailed criticism of Dummett’s anti-realist 
argument (for which purpose, see McDowell 1978 and Devitt 1991, ch. 14). Nor will I 
dwell on his proposal of an anti-realist theory of meaning developed in terms of 
assertability-conditions. What I am concerned with is rather his assumption that 
correspondence truth could play some role in our theory of meaning only if we were 
willing to endorse the (indefensible) thesis of the epistemic accessibility of the God’s eye 
point of view.
A similar line of thought can be found in Putnam 1981, the main difference being 
that Putnam’s argument deals with epistemology rather than the theory of meaning (to be
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sure, Putnam does have an anti-realist argument based on the theory of reference as well; 
but that’s a different story).
Putnam is even more explicit than Dummett in his use of the theological metaphor 
of the God’s eye point of view. He proposes to distinguish ’two philosophical 
perspectives’ (Putnam 1981, ch. 3), which he calls the ’externalist’ and the ’internalist’ 
perspective. The former is also characterized as ’metaphysical realism’, that is, as 
Realism + correspondence truth + the thesis that there is exactly one true and complete 
description of ’the way the world is’. And Putnam calls it the externalist perspective 
exactly because ’its favorite point of view is a God’s Eye point of view’ (Putnam 1981, 
49).
It is apparent that Putnam’s definition of the externalist perspective identifies a 
very demanding doctrine. In fact, he conflates correspondence truth with the ’One True 
Theory* claim. But correspondence truth entails the ‘One True Theory’ claim only if the 
correspondence between language and world is understood as an isomorphism between 
sentences and facts. And we saw in the last section that isomorphism between sentences 
and facts is not an essential feature of an adequate notion of correspondence truth.
An internalist perspective is described by Putnam as dismissing any talk of reality 
implying an ’external’ point of view:
There is no God’s Eye Point of View that we can know or usefully imagine, there 
are only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests 
and purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve.
(Putnam 1981, 50)
According to an internalist perspective, asking What objects does the world consist of? 
only makes sense within a theory or description. Truth cannot be a correspondence 
between our statements and a ready-made world: if truth is to be accessible, it must be 
understood in an epistemic fashion.
Putnam's argument against extemalism can be put quite straightforwardly. To 
ascertain that a given statement is correspondence-true, one ought to have access both to 
her description of the world and to the world as it is in itself, in order to compare their 
features and determine if they fit with each other. But to assume that one could have
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access to the world as it is in itself is to assume that one could place oneself in the God’s 
eye point of view. However, it is widely agreed that our experience of the world is 
always theory-laden, and that its content is always shaped, to some extent, by our 
conceptual schemes. So, Putnam concludes, if our epistemic perspective is always 
determined by our conceptual choices, we will never be in a position to ascertain that a 
given statement is correspondence-true. As access to a God’s eye view is precluded to 
human beings, truth will be for ever inaccessible to their cognitive efforts.
Even if Putnam presents his argument as a refutation of extemalism, his point is 
also relevant for the minimal version of correspondence truth we are primarily concerned 
with. Taking truth to be some form of correspondence between linguistic entities and the 
knowledge-independent world does raise the epistemological problem of the accessibility 
of that world to human knowledge. So we may agree to construe Putnam’s argument as 
an argument against correspondence truth, rather than as an argument against the 
externalist perspectives. However, Putnam’s point is hardly original. Putnam himself 
traces its origins back to Kant. Nevertheless, his argument is representative of a 
widespread belief that acceptance of an evidence-transcendent notion of truth will make 
knowledge impossible. More or less radical versions of the argument are to be found in 
the writings, for example, of Richard Rorty, Arthur Fine, David Bloor and Brian Ellis. 
But Putnam’s use of the metaphor of the God’s eye point of view makes his own version 
particularly vivid.
To sum up: both Dummett and Putnam claim that anyone upholding 
correspondence truth is implicitly committed to the indefensible thesis of the epistemic 
accessibility of the God’s eye point of view. They argue that if a God’s eye view were 
accessible to human beings, then correspondence truth could play a role in our theory of 
meaning (Dummett) or in our epistemology (Putnam). But since that is not the case, 
correspondence truth remains a totally idle concept, and we had better settle for 
something more ready-to-hand.
Putnam explicitly equates his own internalist perspective to Dummett’s anti­
realism (see Putnam 1981, 56). Yet, when we fix our attention on the issue of the 
external, physical world, these two philosophers seem to have significantly different ideas 
about what would count as a God’s eye view. While Dummett is concerned with the 
comprehensiveness of the evidence provided by a God’s eye view, Putnam suggests that
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access to a God’s eye point of view would yield knowledge of the noumenal world. To 
my mind, this difference can be explained by reference to Dummett’s residual 
verificationism about observational beliefs (see, e.g., Dummett 1978, 158) on the one 
hand, and to Putnam’s open Kantianism (see Putnam 1981, 60-64) on the other. 
According to Putnam, the objects of our discourse are always internal to some conceptual 
scheme, yet they somehow point to the existence of a deeper, unknowable reality, i.e., 
that noumenal world that provides ‘a mind-independent "ground” for our experience’ 
(Putnam 1981, 62). On the contrary, Dummett’s anti-realism seems committed to deny 
any deeper dimension to the world: knowledge from the God’s eye point of view would 
not unveil a deeper reality lying beneath the appearances, but would simply provide a 
more extensive information about those appearances themselves.
If my interpretation is correct, Dummett and Putnam are concerned with two 
different species of evidence-transcendence, respectively an ’horizontal’ and a ’vertical’ 
(me. In the remaining part of this work, I shall try to address the challenge arising from 
Putnam’s ’vertical’ species of evidence-transcendence, rather than that arising from 
Dummett’s ’horizontal’ species. The sort of argument I wish to reject is an 
epistemological argument from the (alleged) epistemic inaccessibility of reality in itself 
to the idleness of correspondence truth.
What I wish to argue for is the thesis that acceptance of correspondence-truth does 
not make the claim that we can know some features of the Realist’s world unintelligible. 
In Kantian terms, I wish to argue that acceptance of correspondence truth needn’t confine 
us to phenomenal knowledge: if there is anything that we know, that is reality as it is in 
itself. For knowledge of reality as it is in itself needn’t be knowledge from a God’s eye 
point of view.
30
Chapter 2
Realism Without a God’s Eye View
2.1 Hie Quest for Certainty
Most traditional epistemologies have taken it for granted that objectivity and certainty are 
closely related to each other. In fact many writers have regarded certainty as a sign of 
objectivity, and developed their epistemologies in accordance with that view.
In order to assess such an epistemological project, we need to answer a 
preliminary question. Why do people aspire after objectivity in their cognitive efforts? 
What is it that makes objectivity a virtue?
Claims to objectivity are usually made when the epistemic status of a certain 
statement is challenged by someone who does not believe in its truth. As far as I see, if 
S claims that p is objectively true, what she is actually claiming is that p is true whatever 
opinion any particular subject (and specifically her objector) has about p .
Suppose for a moment that Locke got his account of the primary and secondary 
qualities of things right. Then S cannot be warranted to claim that London’s buses are 
objectively red, although she can be warranted to claim that London’s buses have 
objectively such-and-such a shape. From this perspective, the search for objectivity 
appears to be the search for statements which are true of their object, not of the way that 
object happens to be perceived, known, or taken to be by some cognitive subject. This 
way of looking at the matter helps with the following difficulty. Someone may wish to 
point out that saying of a given sentence that it is objectively true does not add anything 
to saying of that same sentence that it is true. After all, one and the same sentence (read 
‘proposition’, if you like) cannot be true for X and false for Y! So what is the point of 
all this talk of objectivity? Lacking relativistic leanings, I am entirely sympathetic with
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this kind of objection. Yet, saying of a sentence that it is objectively true can be more 
than a rhetorical device. It can be a way to specify the subject-matter of that sentence. 
We say that the sentences about the secondary qualities of things are subjective not 
because they cannot be objectively true of their own subject-matter, but because their 
subject-matter is not restricted to the ‘objective* physical world, but includes the 
Subjective’ perceptual apparatus of the human beings. So saying that in our cognitive 
efforts we aim to come up with sentences that are objectively true may be a way of 
saying that we aim to come up with sentences whose subject-matter is the world as it is 
in itself, rather than as it is in relation to our perceptual apparatus15.
Those philosophers who endorse an epistemic theory of truth usually claim that 
their theories are able to accomodate a satisfactory degree of objectivity within their 
framework. Such philosophers merely have to introduce some distinction between 
empirical and transcendental subjects, or between actual and ideal epistemic situations. 
That done, they can say of whatever statement they like that its truth is objective, i.e., 
independent of the knowledge of any empirical subject, or independent of the cognitive 
outcome of any actual epistemic situation.
I am not sympathetic with such carefully carapaced accounts of epistemic 
objectivity. Nevertheless, these accounts show how deeply entrenched is the belief that 
knowledge must ultimately aspire after some form of objectivity. It can hardly be denied 
that any knowledge claim involves a claim to inter-subjective validity. Roughly, if S 
claims to know that p, her claim will entail, among other things, that anyone presented 
with the relevant evidence ought rationally to believe that p. Thus Kant wrote:
Persuasion is a mere illusion, because the ground of the judgment, which lies 
solely in the subject, is regarded as objective. Such a judgment has only private 
validity, and the holding of it to be true does not allow of being communicated.
I cannot assert anything, that is, declare it to be a judgement necessarily valid for 
everyone, save as it gives rise to conviction [in any rational subject].
(Kant 1933, 645 f.)
15 Of course it is wholly legitimate to set out in search of objective truths about subjective 
phenomena, as various kinds of phenomenological and psychological disciplines try to do.
One may well debate how the class of the cognitive subjects to which the ‘ought’ applies 
can best be defined, but it is hardly deniable that a claim to some sort of inter-subjective 
validity is included in any knowledge claim16. But then, if S claims to know that p, she 
must be claiming that p is objectively true, that is, that the truth-value of p is invariant 
with respect to any member of the class of the relevant cognitive subjects. This suggests 
a possible explanation of the fact that objectivity, for all the qualifications one may wish 
to apply to it, has been traditionally considered an epistemic virtue.
Many philosophers have thought that the best way to gain objectively true beliefs 
(that is, beliefs in sentences/propositions which are objectively true) is the pursuit of 
certainty. If I achieve certainty about a given belief, I will have secured its truth17. But 
since what is true (relative to the class of the relevant epistemic subjects) must be true 
for everyone (in that class), I will have secured objectivity as well. So, goes the advice, 
look for certainty, and you will get objectivity as well.
The quest for certainty lies at the core of the most important research programme 
in modem epistemology - the programme of ‘internalist’ epistemology, as it will be called 
in section 2.2. Starting with Descartes, modem epistemologists have usually sought to 
provide incontrovertible foundations for our knowledge. The certainty of those 
foundations has been thought to secure their (objective) truth as well as that of their 
consequences, and hence to support the claim to inter-subjective validity of our putative 
knowledge.
This is how Descartes presented his epistemological project in a famous passage 
from his Meditations on First Philosophy:
Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found
it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize something
w If the claim is a claim about the ‘secondary’ qualities of things, it will have to be construed as 
an inter-subjective claim about subjective phenomena. The claim that London’s buses are red, for example, 
will have to be construed as involving the claim that any rational subject ought to believe that London’s 
buses look red to normal human beings.
17 In this context, ‘certainty’ is not to be construed as a merely psychological feeling of conviction, 
but, roughly, as an objective property of the content of a certain belief. Furthermore, one must be very 
careful about what exactly can be warrantedly described as ‘certain’: I may be certain that X looks red to 
me, but of course that X is red-relative-to-me does not entail that X is red-relative-to-a-bat!
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certain, or, if nothing else, until I at least recognize for certain that there is no 
certainty.
(Descartes 1984-85, n, 16)
He eventually thought to have found what he was looking for in the proposition, I  am, 
I  exist, which he took to be self-evident and then used as the uncontrovertible foundation 
of his epistemological construction18. As one would expect, in order to carry out his 
project he had to appeal to a bridge-principle saying that whatever is perceived very 
clearly and distinctly - i.e. with the marks of certainty - must be true (Descartes 1984-85, 
n, 24), that is, objectively true. So Descartes can be fairly regarded as a paradigmatic 
example of that kind of epistemological strategy that makes of certainty, conceived as an 
hallmark of objective truth, an essential feature of knowledge.
Of course one needs to be clear about what ‘certainty’ actually means. Certainty 
as a psychological feeling of conviction - ‘I can’t help believing that p’ - will not secure 
the objectivity of p. Philosophers within the ‘Cartesian’ tradition have thus endeavoured 
to come up with non-psychologistic explications of the meaning of ‘certainty’ (as we 
noticed, Descartes’ idea was to spell out certainty in terms of clarity and distinction). But 
for our purposes we needn’t discuss all their proposals in detail. One proposal which is 
worth discussing, though, can be found in Husserl’s Logical Investigations.
Husserl’s position is particularly relevant to our topic as it provides an excellent 
example of an epistemology espousing both correspondence truth and the view that 
correspondence truth involves commitment to the epistemic accessibility of the God’s eye 
point of view (Husserl 1970, n, 760-770).
Husserl lists four different meanings of ‘truth’, but he regards as basic the concept 
of truth as ‘the adaequatio rei ac intellects' (Husserl 1970, n, 670). According to 
Husserl, truth makes itself present in that kind of objectifying act in which ‘the object is 
not merely meant, but in the strictest sense given, and given as it is meant’ (Husserl
11 */ am, I  exist* is the proposition Descartes claims to be necessarily true (‘whenever it is put 
forward by me or conceived by my mind*) in the Second Meditation. This is of course the cogito argument, 
but Descartes himself warns his reader against an easy misconstruction of his formula, cogito, ergo sum: 
‘When someone says "I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist”, he does not deduce existence from thought 
by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind* 
(Descartes 1984-85, I I 100).
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1970, n, 765). This quotation reflects Husserl’s own distinctive terminology. Note first 
of all that ‘object’ is used in a very broad sense, including states of affairs as well. 
Husserl conceives truth as the objective correlate of a psychological act in which a 
meaning-intention comes to perceptual fulfilment. Note that he does not speak of 
sentences, but of meaning-intentions. Meaning-intentions are temporally located 
psychological acts, but Husserl is well aware of the dangers of psychologism, and 
describes their contents, in a Fregean vein, as ‘the self-identical meaning that the hearer 
can grasp even if he is not a percipient' (Husserl 1970, I, 290). When the cognitive 
subject is not facing the intended object, her meaning-intention is a mere meaning- 
intention, that is, void of intuition. But when the intended object comes before the 
subject, her meaning-intention may be fulfilled, if the object is given to her by perception 
(which Husserl understands in a suitably liberalized fashion) in exactly the same way as 
it is meant. If so much happens, Husserl says that an ‘identifying act’ takes place, which 
has as its object ‘the fu ll agreement of what is meant with what is given as such*, that is, 
* being in the sense o f truth, or simply truth* (Husserl 1970, n, 765).
What is particularly relevant to our inquiry is Husserl’s view of the relation 
between truth and self-evidence:
This agreement [i.e., truth] we experience in self-evidence, in so far as self­
evidence means the actual carrying out of an adequate identification.
(Husserl 1970, H, 765)
According to Husserl, whenever we run up against truth we also have the possibility of 
laying it before our consciousness:
Truth is indeed ‘present’. Here we have always the a priori possibility of looking 
towards this agreement, and of laying it before our intentional consciousness in 
an adequate percept.
(Husserl 1970, H, 766)
When a meaning-intention is given the fulness of the object itself, ‘the adaequatio rei ac 
intellectus [...] is itself given, to be directly seized and gazed upon’ (Husserl 1970, n, 
670).
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Husserl’s characterization of ‘self-evidence’ can be seen as an attempt to provide 
a non-psychologistic explication of the notion of ‘certainty*. It is clear that his concept 
of ‘self-evidence’ precludes any interpretation of certainty as a mere ‘feeling’ contingently 
attached to the act of judgement (see Husserl 1970, n, 769). The relation between truth 
and certainty becomes so intimate that Husserl is eventually led to identify knowledge 
with certainty:
The synthesis of fulfilment achieved in this limiting case [the case of an 
objectively complete adequacy of the meaning-intention to the object itself] is self­
evidence or knowledge in the pregnant sense o f the word.
(Husserl 1970, H, 670)
For Husserl certainty is not merely desirable as a sufficient condition for objectivity, nor 
is it simply an essential feature of knowledge: certainty is knowledge itself, in the 
pregnant sense o f the word. Truth cannot be known without the stigmata of certainty.
What I am most interested in emphasizing, though, is Husserl’s assumption that 
acceptance of correspondence truth involves commitment to the epistemic accessibility 
of the God’s eye point of view. Of course he does not use these words, but what else 
could he mean when he says that in the synthesis of fulfilment ‘the object is not merely 
meant, but in the strictest sense given, and given as it is meant’? To be sure, Husserl 
allows for increasing degrees of intuitive fulfilment. Yet he says that the experience of 
fulfilment ‘is represented by the words: “This is the thing itself ’ (Husserl 1970, n, 720). 
If truth is adaequatio rei ac intellects - so goes Husserl’s assumption - knowledge at its 
best must be the self-evidence of that adaequatio. Husserl’s contention is that knowledge 
in this sense is indeed possible, because in the synthesis of fulfilment ‘this adaequatio is 
itself given, to be directly seized and gazed upon’ by the cognitive subject. This is 
tantamount to saying that the cognitive subject has epistemic acess, in certain 
circumstances, both to her description of the world and to the world as it is in itself. 
Moreover, Husserl tells us that she can compare their features, and also that, when the 
object is given as it is meant, she can perceive this agreement in the experience of 
certainty.
The textual evidence of the Logical Investigations allows us to regard Husserl’s 
view as a striking illustration of exactly that kind of epistemology that Putnam strives to
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reject in his attack against ‘metaphysical realism’. On the other hand, Husserl’s view also 
provides a striking illustration of that kind of epistemology that I shall argue a Realist 
needn’t be committed to.
2.2 Three Kinds of Internalist (Externalist) Doctrines
In section 1.5 we came across Putnam’s particular version of the intemalism/extemalism 
dichotomy. But there are at least two other versions of that dichotomy which are 
frequently referred to in the present philosophical debate.
Putnam’s own version had to do with the issue of ‘metaphysical realism’, which 
he rendered as the conjunction of Realism, correspondence truth, and the thesis that there 
is exactly one true and complete description of the way the world is. He called the 
doctrines falling under this composite description ‘externalist’ doctrines because their 
favourite point of view could be described as God’s eye point of view. For the sake of 
terminological simplicity, I shall call this version of the dichotomy the metaphysical 
version.
A different version of the intemalism/extemalism dichotomy is also due to Putnam 
(see Putnam 1975,223-227), although he himself didn’t label it that way (and neither did 
the other father of the doctrine, Tyler Burge, in his 1979). This second version belongs 
to the philosophy o f mind. Roughly, the issue at stake is this: What determines the nature 
of intentional states (or, if you like, of proposidonal attitudes)? Internalist theories of 
mind claim that the nature of intentional states is entirely determined by those factors 
which are ‘internal’ to the subject. Externalist theories claim that the nature (e.g., the 
reference) of intentional states is affected by such ‘external’ factors as the nature of the 
subject’s environment. Putnam’s Twin Earth argument was originally put forward as a 
proof of the view that ‘"meanings" just ain’t in the head* (Putnam 1975, 227). So 
Putnam, while an internalist on the issue of realism, is to be counted as an externalist in 
the philosophy of mind. However, we needn’t spell out this issue in detail. What really 
affects our topic is rather the third version of the dichotomy, to which we now turn our 
attention.
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The third version of the intemalism/extemalism dichotomy, which has been the 
focus of extensive philosophical debate in the last decade or so, arises from 
epistemological concerns. In fact, it is closely linked to the analysis of knowledge and/or 
justification.
An analysis o f‘S knows that p’ is said to be ‘internalist’ when the conditions that 
must be satisfied if S is to know that p are ‘internal’ to S’s awareness, that is, when they 
are (to some extent) epistemically accessible to S. An analysis of ‘S is justified in 
believing that p’ is said to be ‘internalist’ when the grounds that make S’s belief justified 
are ‘internal’ to S’s awareness, that is, when they are (to some extent) epistemically 
accessible to S.
Of course one needs an explanation of what is meant by ‘internal to one’s 
awareness’ and ‘epistemically accessible’. Most of all, one needs an explanation of how 
epistemically accessible the relevant conditions must be in order to justify a claim to 
knowledge (or to epistemic justification). Does S need to know it for certain that those 
conditions are satisfied? Or does she merely need to have access to some evidence that 
they are? Different kinds of internalist epistemologies will issue from different answers 
to these questions.
Take the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief:
S knows that p iff 1) p is true
2) S believes that p
3) S is justified in 
believing that p
Is this analysis internalist or externalist? That depends (1) on our concept of justification 
and (2) on our concept of epistemic accessibility. If our concept of ‘epistemic 
accessibility’ is not too demanding (so that satisfaction of condition 3 may be seen as 
providing epistemic access to the satisfaction of condition 1), and if our concept of 
justification is itself internalist (so that S may be thought to have epistemic acess to the 
satisfaction of 3), this analysis can be described as ‘internalist’ (on the further, reasonable 
assumption that S has epistemic access to the satisfaction of condition 2). On the 
contrary, if (a) our concept of epistemic accessibility is such that nothing can count as 
epistemically accessible which is not known for certain, or if (b) our concept of
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justification is externalist, the JTB account of knowledge will come out as externalist. If 
our concept of epistemic accessibility requires certainty, satisfaction of condition 3 will 
not provide epistemic access to the satisfaction of condition 1 (unless we commit 
ourselves to the rather implausible assumption that one cannot justifiedly believe a false 
proposition). If our concept of justification is externalist, S will not have epistemic access 
to the satisfaction of condition 3.
A much sharper example of an externalist analysis of knowledge is provided by 
the epistemological doctrine which goes under the name of 'reliabilism’:
S knows that p iff 1) p is true
2) p believes that p
3) S came to believe that p by 
means of a reliable belief- 
forming process
Here it is clear that conditions 1 to 3 may be satisfied without S having any epistemic 
access to the satisfaction of condition 3. In fact, S will be mostly unaware of the 
particular belief-forming process that led her to believe that p, let alone of its being 
reliable or not. Reliability accounts of knowledge are thus to be counted as externalist.
I will postpone to later sections a discussion of the internalist and externalist 
theories of justification. What I now want to emphasize is the deep entrenchment of the 
internalist approach to knowledge in the epistemological tradition that has dominated 
Western philosophy since the times of Descartes. Any epistemology which makes of 
certainty a pre-requisite for knowledge will be implicitly committed to an internalist 
analysis of knowing. Both Descartes and Husserl take epistemic accessibility to involve 
certain, or self-evident, knowledge of the object. So they are committed to the thesis that 
‘S knows that p* implies something like (S can know for certain that the conditions which 
must be satisfied for her to know that p are actually met’. In other words, they are 
committed to the thesis that whenever S knows (in the pregnant sense of the word) that 
p, S can also know (in the pregnant sense of the word) that it is the case that she knows 
that p. While Descartes simply says that knowledge that p is incompatible with the
39
slightest doubt about p’s truth19, Husserl refers to a particular objectifying act (that is, 
self-evidence) in which the fulfilment of the necessary conditions for knowledge is 
experienced by the cognitive subject.
In our century, Karl Popper has been one of the fiercest critics of the internalist 
view that knowledge requires certainty. His epistemology rests on a sharp distinction 
between truth and certainty:
We [...] must clearly distinguish between the truth of an expectation or a 
hypothesis and its certainty [...] There is much truth in much of our knowledge, 
but little certainty.
(Popper 1990, 33)
To be sure, other philosophers emphasized the fallibility of human knowledge before 
Popper. The distinctive feature of Popper’s philosophy is rather its insistence on the 
practical incompatibility of the epistemological goals of certainty and objectivity. His idea 
is not just that, our cognitive powers being what they are, we must settle for something 
less than certain knowledge and make do with conjectural knowledge. The reason why 
Popper thinks we had better give up the cognitive aim of certainty is not merely that it 
is beyond our reach. While Descartes recommended that one set out in search of certainty 
if she wanted to find what was objectively true about the world, Popper insists that 
seeking certainty will never lead us to objectivity. His main contention is that looking for 
certainty will lead us to an over-cautious methodological attitude which will prevent us 
from learning anything of interest about reality. On the contrary, if what we are looking 
for is not assurance, but what is objectively true about the world, the most effective 
strategy wifi be to give up the quest for certainty and espouse a much bolder and critical 
attitude towards our own theories.
Popper's approach implies such a radical divorce of the ideals of certainty and 
objectivity that few philosophers have been willing to accept the unpalatable consequences 
of his epistemology. Popper himself has not always lived up to his own epistemological
19 ‘The fact that an atheist can be "clearly aware that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right angles" is something I do not dispute. But I maintain that this awareness of his is not true knowledge, 
since no act of awareness that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge’ (Descartes 1984- 
85, n , 101).
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standards; see, for example, his notorious * "whiff" of inductivism’ footnote in the Schilpp 
volume about his philosophy (Schilpp 1974, 1192-1193).
Contemporary commitment to an internalist analysis of knowledge can be seen as 
a way to preserve the intent of traditional epistemology (which took the quest for 
certainty as an essential feature of any cognitive effort), while at the same time relaxing 
its criteria of epistemic accessibility. Nowadays it is commonplace to see certainty as an 
unattainable goal, and hence as an undesirably strong requirement to be set upon 
knowledge. Nevertheless, many people find it hard to conceive that S might possibly 
know that p without having at least some degree of epistemic access to her own epistemic 
situation. So many philosophers have given up the quest for certainty and settled for some 
kind of internalist epistemology according to which, if we are to have any knowledge, 
we need to have at least some probable grasp of our own epistemic situation. For how 
could one know that p if she had no reason to believe that she did?
To sum up, the terms ‘intemalism’ and ‘extemalism’ can be used to formulate 
three different dichotomies: (1) a metaphysical dichotomy; (2) a dichotomy in the 
philosophy of mind; and (3) an epistemological dichotomy. It is this last dichotomy (with 
its different versions in the theory of knowledge and in the theory of justification) that 
will provide the focus of our discussion in the remaining part of this chapter.
2,3 The Vertical Epistemic Regress Problem
Internalist analyses of knowledge face what I shall call the ‘vertical’ epistemic regress 
problem, in order to distinguish it from the more commonly discussed ‘horizontal’ 
epistemic regress problem.
The horizontal problem stems from the requirement that our beliefs be 
epistemically justified. Anyone will agree, that beliefs can be justified inferentially, i.e., 
by deriving them from other beliefs; but inferential justification cannot be carried on ad 
infinitum. So the horizontal epistemic regress problem is usually developed as an 
argument in support of some kind of foundationalist epistemology. In other words, it is 
maintained that there must be some beliefs which are justified non-inferentially if there 
are to be inferentially justified beliefs at all.
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The vertical epistemic regress problem stems from the internalist requirement that 
the conditions that must be satisfied for S to know that p be epistemically accessible to 
S (see Dancy 1985, 129 ff. and Alston 1989, 210 f.; Bonjour 1980, 54 f. describes the 
same problem, but confines his discussion to basic beliefs). The JTB account of 
knowledge will provide a useful illustration:
S knows that p iff 1) p is true
2) S believes that p
3) S is justified in 
believing that p
Suppose that we construe ‘S has epistemic access to p’ as ‘S is justified in believing that 
p \ Under this assumption, satisfaction of conditions 3 entails epistemic access to the 
satisfaction of condition 1. Furthermore, there seems to be no doubt that S can have 
epistemic access to the satisfaction of condition 2. The vertical epistemic regress problem 
arises with condition 3: has S epistemic access to the satisfaction of this last condition? 
Under our construal of epistemic access, this question can be rendered as: Is S justified 
in believing that she is justified in believing that P? Our internalist construal of the JTB 
account of knowledge turns out to require the satisfaction of a new condition if S is to 
know that p:
4) S is justified in 
believing that she is 
justified in believing 
that p
But then, S will need to have epistemic access to the satisfaction of condition 4 as well, 
and this will lead to an infinite regress.
Things get even worse if we replace ‘S is justified in believing that p’ with ‘S 
knows that p’ as our interpretation o f ‘S has epistemic access to p \
The most straightforward way to stop the vertical regress is to give up the 
internalist analyses of knowledge altogether. In the case of the JTB account of 
knowledge, that means that one should stick to the three original conditions stated in the 
anatysans: ‘S knows that p’ iff conditions 1 to 3 are met, whether S has epistemic access
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to the fact that they are or not (but in fact externalist accounts of knowledge are more 
frequently alternatives to, rather than improvements on, the traditional JTB account of 
knowledge).
A different way of stopping the vertical epistemic regress might be to adopt a 
weaker form of intemalism, as Jonathan Dancy has suggested. Such a weaker form of 
intemalism does not equate epistemic access to knowledge or justified belief, but merely 
to belief. So what is required from S is not that she know or justifiedly believe that the 
relevant conditions for her to know that p are satisfied, but merely that she believe that 
they are (see Dancy 1985, 133 ff.).
For all of Dancy’s assurances, I cannot see why this should count as an internalist 
conception of knowledge. The only way in which it is indeed internalist is that it rules 
out that sense of knowledge in which we sometimes ascribe knowledge to all kind of 
organisms which are well-adapted to their environment. Or rather, it rules out any kind 
of knowledge the cognitive subject is not aware of, such as behavioural dispositions and 
unconscious expectations. I think this to be undesirable, but I don’t want to rest my 
argument on this point. What is relevant is rather that whatever plausibility Dancy 
succeeds in providing his theory with actually comes from a trivial equivocation. Dancy 
tries to convince us that the condition ‘S believes that she is justified in believing that p' 
adequately captures the idea that ‘all that we can ask of a man is that he retain beliefs 
which, so far as he can tell, meet the conditions for justification’ (Dancy 1985, 133). But 
what ‘S believes that she is justified in believing that p’ actually means is just that S 
happens to believe that she is justified in believing that p, not that p, ’so far as [s]he can 
tell, meets the conditions for justification’! Dancy is smuggling in an assumption about 
the rationality of S’s belief-forming processes which he leaves totally unargued for. But 
wishful thinking will not make of an externalist analysis of knowledge an internalist one!
2.4 Nozick’s Externalist ‘Refutation’ of the Sceptic
As far as logic and physics are concerned, we might well be brains in a vat, properly 
stimulated by an evil (or benevolent) scientist to provide us with exactly those 
experiences we presently believe to be caused in us by (what we take to be) the actual
43
world. If this were our situation, we would not know what we usually think we know. 
But then, how is it possible that we know anything, if we cannot rule out the possibility 
that we are just brains in a vat being systematically deceived about our own situation20?
This sceptical challenge has been recently addressed by Robert Nozick on the 
basis of his counterfactual account of *S knows that p’ (see Nozick 1981, ch. 3, esp. 172- 
178; 197-211). Nozick’s argument has been the focus of extensive philosophical debate 
in the last decade. An investigation of the merits and limits of Nozick’s argument will 
help to clarify what is at stake in the controversy between internalist and externalist 
epistemologies.
Nozick’s analysis of knowledge goes as follows:
S knows that p iff 1) p is true
2) S believes that p
3) “»p -«(S believes that p)
4) p O-* S believes that p
As in section 1.2, the box-arrow stands for the subjunctive conditional Tf it were the case 
that..., then it would be the case that...’. Nozick would like to claim that his definition 
doesn’t commit him to any particular semantics for subjunctive conditionals. But he has 
to refer to Robert Stalnaker’s and David Lewis’ ‘possible-worlds’ theories as to the best 
candidates for such a role (see Nozick 1981, 680, note 8), because there are relevant 
circumstances in which no informal reading of condition 4 seems to be possible.
If conditions 1 and 2 are met, condition 3 can be easily read without any 
‘possible-world’ aid as Tf it were the case that not-p, S wouldn’t believe that p*. It is 
more difficult to provide an intuitively satisfactory reading of condition 4. For what does 
Tf it were the case that p, S would believe that p’ mean if it is actually the case that p 
and S believes that p? According to a suitable revision of Stalnaker’s and Lewis’ possible- 
worlds semantics, if one wants to decide whether the subjunctive conditional p D* q is 
true, she will have to examine those possible p-worlds that are closest (most similar) to
* Having repeatedly referred in chapter 1 to Putnam’s bode, Reason, Truth and History, in which 
a very well-known ‘Brain in a Vat’ argument is devised, I should probably make clear that the argument 
I discuss here is definitely not Putnam’s argument (which is, to some extent, an argument against 
scepticism).
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the actual world, and see if q holds true in all of them. If it does, the subjunctive 
conditional holds true in the actual world. Thus condition 4 turns out to mean something 
like: ‘In all those worlds in which p holds true that are closest to the actual world, it is 
also true that S believes that p’. If, under the assumption that conditions 1 and 2 are met, 
one wanted to render condition 4 in a slightly more familiar language, she would 
probably have to go for something like this: ‘(p is true and S believes that p, and) S 
would believe that p in all those (slightly) different circumstances in which p were to hold 
true’.
The idea that Nozick’s counterfactual analysis of knowing is meant to capture is 
that S knows that p only if her belief that p is ‘sensitive’ both to the truth and to the 
falsity of p. If S knows that p, she doesn’t merely happen to believe truly that p: ‘To 
know that p is to be someone who would believe it if it were true, and who wouldn’t 
believe it if it were false’ (Nozick 1981, 178). Nozick sums up this idea of a subjunctive 
connection between S’s belief about p and p’s truth-value by saying that S’s belief 
‘tracks’ the truth that p:
To know is to have a belief that tracks the truth. Knowledge is a particular way 
of being connected to the world, having a specific real factual connection to the 
world: tracking it.
(Nozick 1981, 178)
Here I am not so much concerned with the adequacy of Nozick’s account to our intuitions 
about what should be counted as knowledge (some useful remarks on this matter can be 
found in Goldman 1988, 57-63), as with the anti-sceptical strategy which he develops on 
the basis of that account (but we shall eventually see that these two questions are closely 
related).
The sceptical argument presented at the beginning of this section relies on the 
principle P that knowledge is closed under known logical implications (Nozick 1981,204 
ff.). This principle says, roughly, that if S knows that p and if S knows that ‘p entails q’, 
then S also knows that q. Principle P enables the sceptic to argue, by modus tollens, that 
if S knows that ‘p entails q’ and she doesn’t know that q, then she cannot possibly know 
that p.
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Let p be ‘S is sitting in her room reading a book’ and q be ‘S is not a brain in a 
vat’. We can suppose that S knows that ‘p entails q’ (i.e., that she cannot both be sitting 
in her room reading a book and be a brain in a vat). Yet S doesn’t seem to know that q 
(for it is indeed logically and physically possible for S to be a brain in a vat). So how can 
S possibly know that p (i.e., that she is sitting in a room reading a book) if she doesn’t 
know that q (i.e., that she is not a brain in a vat)? The sceptical predicament arises from 
the possibility of imagining a whole set of ‘sceptical worlds’ supposedly different from 
the one in which we believe we are, but which nevertheless would cause us to have the 
very same experiences we actually happen to have. Such ‘sceptical worlds’ would be 
evidentially indistinguishable from, and hence doxically identical to, the one which is 
supposedly ours (different worlds are said by Nozick to be ‘doxically identical' for S iff 
S would have exactly the same beliefs in any of them21). But, so goes the sceptical 
argument, if we cannot tell that we are not living in one of those sceptical worlds, we 
cannot know anything at all about our own world. For none of our actual beliefs (about 
the world) would be true if we were in fact living in a sceptical world.
However, Nozick’s analysis of *S knows that p’ has the nice consequence that in 
general S can be said to know that p and that *p entails q’ without being required to know 
that q. In other words, Nozick’s analysis entails that knowledge is not closed under 
known logical implications (Nozick 1981, 204-211). Let us see how the counterfactual 
analysis of knowing handles our example involving the propositions p, ‘S is sitting in her 
room reading a book’, and q, ‘S is not a brain in a vat’. It is immediately clear that S 
cannot be said to know that q, because if she were a brain in a vat (“»q) she would 
nevertheless believe that she weren’t (that is, she would believe that q), since that 
sceptical world would be doxically identical to what she takes to be the actual world. So 
Nozick will grant the sceptic that S doesn’t know that she is not a brain in a vat. Yet, if 
S tracks the truth that p, she can be said to know that she is sitting in her room reading 
a book:
21 The hypothesis under discussion differs from Descartes* evil demon hypothesis (see Descartes 
1984-85, II, 15) in so far as a ‘sceptical world* must be understood as a world in which S has (is?) in fact 
a functioning brain, and in which S*s beliefs arise by means of the ordinary belief-forming processes which 
occur within brains, the only difference being that the inputs transmitted by S’s afferent nerve endings are 
not produced by the sort of facts which are usually thought to produce diem.
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For (3’) [i.e., ‘if q were false, S wouldn’t believe that q*] talks of what S would 
believe if q were false, and this may be a very different situation from the one 
that would hold if p were false, even though p entails q. [...] There is no reason 
to assume the (closest) not-p world and the (closest) not-q world are doxically 
identical for you, and no reason to assume, even though p entails q, that your 
beliefs in one of these worlds would be a (proper) subset of your beliefs in the 
other.
(Nozick 1981, 206 f.)
In other terms, when we assess the truth-value of ‘if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that 
p’, we need to consider those possible not-p worlds that are closest (most similar) to the 
actual world, and see if ‘S doesn’t believe that p’ holds true in all of them. We don’t 
have to consider those possible not-p worlds which, like all not-q worlds, are most distant 
from (most dissimilar to) the actual world. Thus, since none of the relevant not-p worlds 
will be a world in which S falsely believes that p, condition 3 will be satisfied, and S can 
be said to track the truth that p, even if she cannot be said to track the truth that q.
Can we conclude with Nozick that his account of knowing, having as a 
consequence that knowledge is not closed under known logical implications, successfully 
undermines the sceptical challenge by showing that indeed we can have some knowledge 
of the (external) world?
An apparently destructive criticism of Nozick’s claim is contained in a brief paper 
by Edward Craig (see Craig 1989). The argument is very straightforward. According to 
Nozick’s analysis, if any sceptical world is a close possible world, we don’t really know 
what we think we know. But since the actual world is a close world, if we want to defeat 
the sceptic we need to be in a position to assert that the actual world is not a sceptical 
world.
But if we are in a position to assert that the actual world is not a sceptical world 
then the sceptic must somehow already have been defeated without recourse to the 
‘tracking’ analysis; if we are not in a position to assert it, recourse to the analysis 
doesn’t help.
(Craig 1989, 161)
According to Craig, Nozick may be right in his contention that principle P is false, but 
that doesn’t show that we are warranted to claim any knowledge whatsoever about the 
world.
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Craig’s argument is valid, but what it shows is not really incompatible with 
Nozick’s claims. Craig’s argument shows that the counterfactual analysis of knowing is 
unable to prove that we have some actual knowledge of the world. But that has nothing 
to do with what Nozick's analysis is intended to prove in the first place. Nozick’s 
analysis is intended to prove that S may (not: does) know that p even without knowing 
that she is not a brain in a vat. In other terms, the counterfactual analysis of knowing 
implies that knowing that one’s world is not a sceptical world is not a necessary condition 
for having any knowledge at all. Craig’s reply does not undermine this result.
Why should this result have any bearing on the sceptical challenge though? After 
all, Nozick hasn’t shown us that we do know that p. Are we epistemologically any better 
off after Nozick has told us that we might be in a position to know that p, although we 
cannot know whether we actually are?
I think Nozick’s result is indeed relevant to the sceptical challenge. If it doesn’t 
seem so to Craig or to any other reader, it is merely because of his (her) own implicit 
commitment to an internalist view of knowledge. If the conditions that are to be met if 
S is to know that p need to be epistemically accessible to S, then no proof of the 
possibility of knowledge falling short of establishing the actuality of some instance of 
knowledge will ever meet the sceptical challenge. That is to say, commitment to 
intemalism prevents any putative instance of knowledge which is not certifiable as such 
from within (e.g., the actual tracking relation which Nozick takes to be the referent of 
the phrase ‘S knows that she is sitting in her room reading a book’) from being a possible 
candidate to meet the sceptical challenge. Craig doesn’t see (or doesn’t want to see) what 
Nozick’s point really is. Nozick doesn’t want to meet the sceptical challenge by proving 
the existence of instances of knowledge which satisfy the internalist constraints. He wants 
to deny the very adequacy of those internalist constraints by showing that there is a sense 
in which we may have knowledge (i.e., have a ‘specific real factual connection to the 
world’) even if those constraints are not satisfied.
That Nozick’s analysis of knowledge is externalist should have by now become 
apparent, for it does not set any requirement of justification upon S’s belief that p. 
Furthermore, if S doesn’t know that she is not a brain in a vat, surely she cannot know 
(in the sense required by the sceptic’s challenge) that she is tracking the truth that p (if 
she is). Whether in any particular case S is tracking the truth that p will be a completely
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objective matter, altogether independent from S’s awareness of her own epistemic 
situation. But according to Nozick’s analysis, S needn't know (or justifiedly believe) that 
she knows that p in order to know that p22! So Nozick’s analysis of knowing falls 
squarely in the externalist camp. As a consequence, it won’t help to reject his argument 
merely by showing that it doesn’t prove the existence of instances of knowledge which 
satisfy the internalist requirements on knowledge. What will have to be discussed is 
rather whether an externalist view of knowledge can provide a satisfactory alternative to 
the internalist orthodoxy, or whether extemalism must be seen, on the contrary, ’as 
simply abandoning the traditional idea of epistemic justification or rationality and along 
with it anything resembling the traditional conception of knowledge’ (Bonjour 1980,70).
2.5 Externalist Knowledge and Internalist Justification
We have so far been discussing (epistemological) intemalism and extemalism qua 
doctrines about the nature of knowledge. We have not explored them qua doctrines about 
the nature of epistemic justification. Some writers tend to conflate these two issues. I take 
this to be a legacy of their past (or present) commitment to the traditional account of 
knowledge as justified true belief (see, e.g., Chisholm 1989, ch. 8, esp. 75 f., and 
Bonjour 1980, esp. 53 f.). If what turns a true belief into knowledge is its being an 
epistemicaUy justified belief, then an externalist account of justification will necessarily 
yield an externalist account of knowledge. Of course the reverse entailment does not 
obtain. Yet, the influence of the JIB account of knowledge has been so strong that many 
internalist epistemologists seem unable to understand their colleagues’ attempt to develop 
an externalist view of knowledge other than as an attempt to provide a different, 
externalist version of the notion of epistemic justification. When confronted with an 
externalist definition of knowledge, they will interpret it straightaway as the proposal of
22 ‘To know that p  is to actually be related to the world in a certain way, namely, to track it. But 
die nature of the tracking relation is such that you can trade die fact that p  without also tracking the fact 
that you are tracking p . [...] If knowledge is a real relationship in the world, such as tracking, then it will 
be a fact that you stand in that relationship to p; so room will be left for failing to stand in that very 
(tracking) relationship to the fact that you stand in it to p. If die knowledge relationship is a stringent one, 
not easily satisfied, there will be many cases of knowing without knowing that one knows* (Nozick 1981, 
246).
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an externalist account of epistemic justification. They will then proceed to dismiss it as 
totally irrelevant to ‘the analysis of any ordinary concept of knowledge or of epistemic 
justification’ on the ground that it cannot provide any answer to such questions as ‘What 
can I know?’, ‘How can I be sure that my beliefs are justified?’ and ‘How can I improve 
my present stock of beliefs?’ (Chisholm 1989, 76).
This I maintain is a mistake. An externalist view of knowledge will indeed look 
irrelevant to any traditional epistemological issue if it is taken to imply commitment to 
an externalist view of epistemic justification. But such an implication cannot be taken for 
granted.
I take it that for many people the main obstacle to accepting an externalist view 
of knowledge is the fear of ending up with the impossibility of ascribing any kind of 
rationality to human beliefs. When phrased in terms of epistemic justification, this 
objection can be summarized by the following question: If one cannot tell whether a 
given belief is epistemically justified, why should its acceptance be counted as rational 
merely because that belief happens to track the truth? For it seems that acceptance of a 
belief can be counted as rational only if the cognitive subject has some epistemic access 
to whatever makes her belief justified. Essentially the same objection can be phrased in 
terms of knowledge, without recourse to the notion of justification: If one cannot tell 
whether a given belief provides any true knowledge of the world, why should its 
acceptance be counted as rational merely because that belief happens to track the truth?
These objections arise from a legitimate concern. If one of the aims of 
epistemology is to advice cognitive subjects about the most effective strategies for 
knowledge acquisition (‘How can I improve my present stock of beliefs?’), we shall need 
what has been called a ‘regulative’ notion of justification (Goldman 1980,28 f.; see also 
Nagel 1986, 69). I take it for granted that any prescriptive epistemology will advice us 
to believe (accept) exactly those statements which come out as (comparatively) best 
justified on the basis of its own criteria of justification. But if one is to follow this 
suggestion, she will need to have epistemic access to the justifiedness of her own beliefs. 
A suggestion like ‘Retain justified beliefs and reject (or suspend judgement on) unjustified 
beliefs’ will be completely idle if one is not in a position to tell which of one's own 
beliefs should be counted as epistemically justified and which should not. It seems clear
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to me that the notion of justification can be assigned a ‘regulative’ role in our 
epistemology only if justifiedness is taken to be epistemically accessible.
That an externalist conception of knowledge will not provide, by itself, any 
relevant answer to the traditional questions of prescriptive epistemology is obviously true. 
But that does not mean that an externalist conception of knowledge will prevent the 
development of any relevant answer to those questions.
I argued in the first chapter that Realism does not entail the claim of the epistemic 
accessibility of the God’s eye point of view. My working hypothesis was that Realism 
could best be defended by severing its links with any form of epistemological theory 
involving commitment to that claim. In order to flesh out that hypothesis, I now wish to 
examine how an epistemology consisting of an accurate blend of extemalism in the theory 
of knowledge and intemalism in the theory of justification (plus an externalist meta-theory 
of justification) could allow the Realist to renounce the God’s eye view without being 
compelled to endorse a sceptical attitude towards knowledge and human rationality.
2.6 Is Epistemic Justification Essential to Knowledge?
In the limits of this work, I cannot dwell on the details of the various versions of 
knowledge-extemalism which have been proposed in recent years. Fred Dretske, for 
example, defines *K knows that s is F* as s belief that s is F is caused (or causally 
sustained) by the information [in the technical sense of communication theory] that s is 
F  (Dretske 1981,86), while David Armstrong’s ‘reliabilist’ account of knowing requires 
that there be ‘a law-like connection between the state of affairs Bap and the state of 
affairs which makes ”p ” true, such that, given Bap, it must be the case that />’ 
(Armstrong 1973, 166). Other externalist analyses of ‘knowing* can be found in the 
writings of Alvin Goldman, Alan Goldman and William Alston. Each of these accounts 
has its own pros and cons, and I cannot embark on a discussion of how faithfully each 
of them analyses our ordinary concept of ‘knowledge’. What I am most interested in is 
the fact that all these analyses understand knowledge as a real relationship in the world, 
which can obtain (or fail to obtain) independently of the subject’s having epistemic access 
to its own epistemic situation. This relationship can be variously characterized as a
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counterfactual (Nozick), nomic (Armstrong), or causal-plus-information-theoretic 
(Dretske) relationship. However, it is not essential to my purposes to decide which of 
these different characterizations gets closer to the truth. In the remaining part of this 
work I shall focus my attention on the general features shared by all versions of 
knowledge-extemalism, leaving aside the question of which specific relationship obtains 
(if knowledge-extemalism is right) between S and the fact that p when S knows that p.
Can the conjunction of an internalist account of justification with an externalist 
account of knowledge constitute a legitimate epistemological option? And can it suffice 
to dispel the worry that the mere acceptance of the latter is enough to make an account 
of the rationality of human beliefs impossible?
As far as I am concerned, the main point to be stressed in this context is that 
epistemic justification is not essential to knowledge, although it is essential to knowledge 
claims23.1  do not claim any particular originality for this point (see Dretske 1981, 123- 
128), but I do have to say that part of the recent debate about intemalism and extemalism 
has been prejudiced by the opposite assumption that epistemic justification is indeed 
essential to knowledge.
If epistemic justification has to do with knowledge claims, rather than knowledge 
as such, there will be no difficulty in accepting an externalist conception of knowledge 
and an internalist conception of justification. Furthermore, acceptance of an externalist 
notion of knowledge will not preclude the understanding of such activities as discussing, 
evaluating, criticizing, and claiming knowledge as rational activities. The traditional 
questions of prescriptive epistemology will then be discussed from the perspective of an 
internalist theory of justification, which will be taken to be relevant not to our definition 
of knowledge, but to the critical assessment of our claims to knowledge. As a 
consequence, the rationality of our cognitive efforts will be understood not as the 
rationality of our beliefs, but as the rationality of our critical evaluation of their claims 
about reality.
33 The notion of a ‘knowledge claim* can be understood in a narrow sense and in a broad sense. 
In the narrow sense, a knowledge claim is the act performed by uttering the sentence, T know that p \ In 
die broad sense, a knowledge claim is the act performed by asserting that p. One cannot assert that p 
without committing oneself to provide some justification for die claim that p.
In the present work I shall generally understand the notion of a knowledge claim in the latter, 
broader sense.
52
In order to clarify this point, let us have a look at a short story devised by 
Laurence Bonjour as a counter-example to the externalist theories of knowledge:
Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no 
evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a 
cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman 
comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no 
evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from 
his clarvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely reliable.
(Bonjour 1980, 62)
Bonjour originally devised his story having in mind Armstrong’s particular version of 
extemalism, which he took to be a typical example of what is usually called a ‘reliabilist’ 
theory of knowledge. A reliabilist theory of knowledge explicates ‘S knows that p' as 
(roughly) ‘S came to believe that p by applying a reliable cognitive method, that is a 
method which is likely to produce mostly true beliefs’ (Armstrong’s own version further 
explicates the reliability of cognitive methods in terms of a law-like connection between 
S’s believing that p and the state of affairs which makes p true). However, we may safely 
disregard the circumstance that Bonjour’s example was originally devised in terms of 
Armstrong’s reliability theory and take it as a challenge to externalist theories of knowing 
in general.
Bonjour’s contention is that Norman cannot intuitively be described as being 
epistemically justified in believing that the President is in New York City: 'why should 
the mere fact that such an external relation obtains mean that Norman’s belief is 
epistemically justified, when the relation in question is entirely outside his ken?’ (Bonjour 
1980, 63). So far, so good. But Bonjour takes this to imply that Norman cannot be 
described as knowing that the President is in New York City either: ‘From his standpoint, 
there is apparently no way in which he could know the President’s whereabouts' (Bonjour 
1980, 62). This suggestion I believe should be resisted.
I think Norman’s epistemic situation can be better described on the basis of a 
separate treatment of knowledge and justification by saying that he does know that the 
President is in New York City, although he is not justified in believing that and thus 
cannot claim that he does.
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Saying that Norman knows that' the President is in New York City under the 
circumstances described in Bonjour’s story may sound peculiar only if the possession of 
knowledge is taken to imply the possession of justification, and thus to warrant the 
statement of a knowledge claim. But if knowledge that p is not taken to licence the claim 
that cme knows that p, the peculiarity of our own way of describing Norman’s epistemic 
situation rapidly disappears. Should Norman wish to claim to have knowledge that the 
President is in New York City, he would clearly need to assess the reliability of the 
cognitive method which led him to endorse his belief. As Bonjour points out, he would 
need to assess the possibility of reliable clairvoyance in general and to decide whether 
he himself possesses such a cognitive faculty. If he could succeed in carrying out this task 
and if the outcome of his inquiry were to be favourable, he would then be able to provide 
a justification for his belief and could be inclined to claim that he not only believes that 
the President is in New York City, but that he knows that.
This way of looking at Norman's epistemic situation turns out to be much more 
natural than that provided by the Cartesian approach of traditional epistemology. After 
all, a ‘fundamental facet of animate life, both human and infra-human, is telling things 
apart, distinguishing predator from prey, for example, or a protective habitat from a 
threatening one. The concept of knowledge has its roots in this kind of cognitive activity’ 
(Goldman 1976, 791).
Nowadays we believe that natural selection has programmed in our nervous 
systems (and in those of most living creatures) a whole set of (quasi-)beliefs and (quasi-) 
belief-forming processes which enable us to cope with our environment and to acquire 
new, individual knowledge. After Chomsky it has been widely accepted that some kind 
of highly structured innate disposition to language-acquisition must be ascribed to human 
beings if we are to account for their competence to understand a virtually infinite set of 
sentences. But if Chomsky's hypothesis cannot be regarded as completely 
uncontroversial, different evidence of a more unobjectionable sort can be provided. It is 
widely agreed, for example, that our central nervous system is programmed to interpret 
certain visual inputs according to some rigid rules which in most cases provide the ‘right’ 
perceptual output, but which in a very limited range of circumstances don’t. But even in 
those circumstances in which one is aware, on the basis of some independent evidence, 
that a given interpretation of one’s visual inputs is actually incorrect, one is not in a
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position to modify that interpretation on the perceptual level, but only to disbelieve it on 
the cognitive level.
There would be no point here in multiplying the examples of such preprogrammed 
beliefs and belief-forming processes we constantly rely on in our cognitive practice 
without even being aware of their being operating. What I wish to emphasize is rather 
that the overall picture suggested by currently accepted theories in the fields of 
psychology, neuroscience and evolution theory can hardly be reconciled with anything 
resembling Descartes’ attempt to question the validity of the whole corpus of our beliefs 
and then reestablish it from scratch. ‘Intemalism encourages the idea that [...] we must 
first select a criterion of truth - a principle for deciding which propositions are true - 
before we form any beliefs’ (Goldman 1980, 47). But in fact biological evolution has 
endowed us with a whole set of beliefs and belief-forming processes which form the basis 
of our most sophisticated cognitive activities but which are themselves unconscious and 
at any rate had long been accepted and relied on before any philosopher even began to 
think of them as in need of epistemic justification. Of course this doesn’t mean that 
Descartes’ epistemological project is meaningless or a priori doomed to failure. But it 
does suggest that the combination of an externalist view of knowledge with an internalist 
view of justification may provide, after all, a more natural picture of the epistemic 
situation of human beings than Cartesian intemalism.
An externalist view of knowledge may provide a concept of knowledge general 
enough to cover such instances of cognitive situations as an electric-eye door knowing that 
someone (something) is coming, or an ant knowing that forage is available at the end of 
the tracks of the foragers who have come back heavy laden, while an internalist view of 
justification may provide the Regulative’ notion of epistemic justification required for an 
account of the rationality of such activities as discussing, evaluating, criticizing, and 
claiming knowledge. The resulting picture will be able to accomodate all the phenomena 
epistemology is traditionally taken to be committed to account for.
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2.7 The Divorce of Certainty and Truth
The price to be paid for the adoption of such a picture is of course that one must be 
prepared to give up the cognitive goal of certainty and make do with objective truth. We 
saw at the beginning of this chapter why the pursuit of certainty has been frequently taken 
to be the best way to acquire objectively true beliefs. However, correspondence truth 
provides a perfectly clear sense in which a sentence can be said to be objectively true (or 
false) independently of the epistemic warrant one may have for accepting (or rejecting) 
it. If what makes a sentence either true or false is its structure, the referential relations 
between its parts and reality, and how reality is independently of anybody’s knowledge 
(see 1.4 above), then the issue of the truth-value of a sentence will be totally distinct 
from any epistemic issue concerning the degree of confidence any particular (or idealized) 
cognitive subject is willing (or justified) to grant to that sentence. I may believe that a 
given sentence is true, I may be justified in believing that it is true, I may even be certain 
that it is true, and yet, according to the correspondence theory of truth, the truth-value 
of that sentence will not depend on my belief or on the grounds of my belief. That 
sentence’s being true will never be identical with, or a function of, its being known (or 
justifiedty believed) to be true.
The correspondence theory of truth provides a perfectly clear sense in which we 
can say that our cognitive efforts, though aimed at the achievement of objective truth 
(i.e., of objectively true statements about the world), do not aspire after cognitive 
certainty (or high cognitive probability). Cognitive certainty (or probability) may provide 
a symptom of objective truth, but we needn’t set out in search of the former if what we 
want to obtain is the latter. Certainty and truth are different things, and we can search 
for the latter without worrying about the former.
Earlier in this chapter we referred to Popper’s contention that truth and certainty 
may even turn out to be incompatible goals for our cognitive efforts: an over-cautious 
methodology is unlikely to lead us to new and deeper insights into the structure of reality; 
it is more likely to yield minor (and usually ad hoc) revisions of our old theories 
whenever they appear to require adjustment to restore their accordance with the available 
experimental evidence. However, there are circumstances - especially practical 
circumstances - in which the reliability of our beliefs is of critical importance. When it
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comes to the technological applications of science, it is clear that we are strongly 
concerned about the reliability, not only the objective truth, of our theories. So the 
problem of the reliability of the technological applications of science will have to be 
addressed, at some stage, by any satisfactory theory of knowledge. I suspect that the 
concept of epistemic certainty will play no role in the explanation of that reliability, but, 
however this may be, the cognitive goal of objective truth remains conceptually distinct 
from that of epistemic certainty, probability or reliability.
We may wish to ascribe to an electric-eye door objectively true quasi-beliefs about 
its surroundings, but should we ascribe it any access to its own epistemic situation? Can 
we ascribe to the electric-eye door any awareness of its (generally reliable) quasi-beliefs? 
And when it opens, is it certain that someone (something) is coming, or does it merely 
believe that someone (something) is coming with, degree of confidence 0.51? The same 
problem arises with the ascription of beliefs to animal agents* The instinctive behaviour 
that natural selection has endowed an ant with may be interpreted as the outcome of 
objectively true quasi-beliefs, but has the ant any access to its own epistemic situation? 
Talk of cognitive certainty (or probability) in the description of such elementary cognitive 
situations seems superfluous or definitely out of place. I can see no compelling reason 
why epistemic certainty (or probability) should become an essential feature of those more 
complex epistemic situations in which human agents are involved.
The correspondence theory of truth plays an important role in the shift from 
epistemological dogmatism to epistemological fallibilism. If truth is no longer seen as a 
function of some epistemic concept, there can be knowledge without certainty. This fact 
makes it possible to understand knowledge as a naturalistic relationship between an agent 
and its environment. The obtaining of such a relationship becomes a completely objective 
matter, which has nothing to do with the agent’s capability of providing an 
uncontrovertible ground for her own beliefs. The lack of any conclusive justification of 
the agent’s beliefs is wholly compatible with her being in possession of some real 
knowledge. Such an externalist view may be seen as the most consequential form of an 
anti-psychologisdc conception of knowledge.
In its classical formulation in the writings of Frege and Husserl, anti-psychologism 
represents a reaction to the empiricist identification of the laws of logic with the laws of 
human thought. Both philosophers took great pains to persuade their contemporaries that
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the truths of logic must not be understood as empirical generalizations about what human 
beings can (or cannot) believe, and as a whole they succeeded in their effort.
Both Frege and Husserl were prompted to oppose psychologism in the philosophy 
of logic by their objectivism about truth: they could not accept the idea that (logical) truth 
could be in any way dependent upon the judging subject. Making logical truth dependent 
upon the judging subject would have meant relativizing it to the contingent (and possibly 
variable) constitution of the human species. Being reluctant to accept such a 
relativization, Frege and Husserl strenuously argued that logical truths, far from being 
empirical generalizations about mental processes, must be regarded as ‘boundary stones 
set in an eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow, but never displace' (Frege 
1967, 13).
Even if I think that we still have good reasons to subscribe to an and- 
psychologistic view of logic, today we are unlikely to be so dogmatic about the status of 
logical truths. However, such an externalist view of knowledge as I am trying to defend 
seems to me to provide a natural complement for an objectivist view of truth, and 
represents the most thoroughgoing outcome of an anti-psychologistic attitude towards 
rationality. The view that knowledge does not necessarily entail justification prompts the 
elimination of a further psychologistic element from our epistemology. On this view, not 
only truth is seen as independent of the knowing subject, but knowledge itself comes to 
be understood without reference to the knowing subject’s being justified in her own 
(objectively true) belief. Since the justifiedness of a belief is in ordinary circumstances 
subject-relative (my being justified in believing that I  have an headache does not entail 
that everybody is justified in believing that I  have an headache) as well as species-relative 
(my being justified in believing that /  see a red spot does not entail that any alien being 
confronted with the same situation would be justified in believing that she saw a red 
spot), this amounts to a de-psychologization of our notion of knowledge. In other terms, 
in the same way as truth is thought by Frege and Husserl to be independent of what any 
particular subject may believe, knowledge is now thought to be independent of what any 
particular subject may be justified in believing. In this sense I describe my favourite view 
of knowledge as naturalistic.
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2.8 Is There any Internal lin k  Between Justification and Truth?
Knowledge as such does not require epistemic justification. But the activity of justifying 
(or criticizing) any sort of knowledge claims is central to human rationality. This fact has 
to do with the growth of human knowledge and with the claim to inter-subjective validity 
characteristic of its most developed forms, especially of its scientific forms.
Epistemic justification may be thought to have made its first appearance in the 
cognitive activities of those human beings who originally began to reflect upon the 
reliability of their own beliefs about themselves and their environment. However, people 
are usually less critical of their own opinions than they are of the opinions of their 
neighbours24. So epistemic justification is much more likely to have made its first 
appearance in the social context of some primitive form of linguistic communication 
(further reasons in support of this hypothesis will be given in section 3.3). Epistemic 
justification is likely to have appeared in connection with some form of social cooperation 
between individuals, when language began to be used to describe facts, and not merely 
to control the behaviour of other members of the group (of the various philosophical 
speculations about the origin of language, I favour Karl Buhler’s hypothesis according 
to which language originally emerged as a signalling, or triggering, device, and only later 
developed its expressive and descriptive functions; see Buhler 1927, ch. 2). Some 
individuals will have uttered claims about the right way to perform a certain task or 
achieve a certain end, and they will have supported their claims with rudimentary forms 
of epistemic justification, particularly of an analogical or metaphorical kind. If I am right, 
epistemic justification may have emerged as a way of backing particular knowledge 
claims uttered with the intent of securing the success of some form of cooperative 
behaviour.
In such a situation, the personal knowledge of the individual is given a linguistic 
objectification, so that it may become the object of a claim to inter-subjective validity. 
The individual discloses what she believes and presents it as knowledge, claiming 
everybody’s assent to the content of her belief. In this way, she commits herself to 
defend her knowledge claim and to engage in the activity of justifying it.
24 If we believe that p, normally we do not ask ourselves if our belief is justified. But if someone 
else claims that not-p, we ask her to justify her claim, because it contradicts our own belief.
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The idea that epistemic justification is to be regarded as necessary to knowledge 
claims rather than knowledge does not prevent an adequate consideration of its role in 
those public cognitive activities which are best represented by modem science. For it is 
precisely the claim to inter-subjective validity made on behalf of the results of those 
public activities that accounts for the relevance of the problem of the epistemic 
justification of those claims. In other terms, the requirement that the claims of science 
be epistemically justified does not arise from science’s being a form of knowledge, but 
from science’s own claim (or rather, from the scientists’ claim) to the inter-subjective 
validity of its cognitive results. The requirement of epistemic justification is built into the 
inter-subjective nature of science, which is not the sum total of the beliefs privately held 
by the scientists, but a multifarious (and changing) corpus of theories and hypotheses 
claiming the assent of every rational subject. In order to emphasize this idea, Karl Popper 
uses the phrase ‘objective knowledge' as a technical term referring to the corpus of the 
cognitive claims of science as opposed to the ‘subjective knowledge’ represented by the 
personal beliefs of the individual scientists (see Popper 1972). But of course his 'objective 
knowledge’ is rarely true knowledge, unless we decide to restrict the label (contrary to 
Popper’s own intention) to that limited part of contemporary science which consists in 
fact of true claims about the world. This is why I prefer to keep the word 'knowledge’ 
for what I have called 'personal’ knowledge, i.e. for a particular relationship a given 
individual can bear to her environment, and treat the corpus of the theories and 
hypotheses of science as a corpus of claims to rational assent.
There would be more things to say about epistemic justification and how the ideal 
of inter-subjectivity characteristic of modem science affects its 'intemality’ (can scientific 
justification be epistemically accessible merely to one particular scientist or does it need 
to be accessible to any scientist - or rational being - in general?). However, I want to 
address the general problem of the relationship between epistemic justification and truth 
first, because a discussion of this problem will help to clarify some confusions in the 
recent debate between externalist and internalist approaches to epistemology.
The problem can be phrased as follows: Is there any internal link between 
epistemic justification and truth? Does epistemic justification guarantee any specified 
degree of epistemic access to truth? Or should we rather consider the link between
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epistemic justification and truth as merely contingent? In what circumstances can a 
justified belief fail to be true?
That a justified belief may fail to be true is widely accepted today (or the huge 
literature on the Gettier’s counter-examples to the JIB account of knowledge could never 
have flourished). Foundadonalist epistemologists who believe in the existence of 
incorrigible beliefs of some sort deny that every kind of epistemic justification should be 
regarded as fallible. From the perspective of (strong) foundationalism, there is indeed 
some kind of epistemic justification (usually the justification provided by the self-evident 
character of those beliefs which express the subject's own psychological states) which 
secures an infallible access to truth. (Strong) foundationalism can thus be seen as positing 
an internal link between some non-inferential form of epistemic justification and truth. 
But what can be said of those epistemologies which do not contemplate any form of 
infallible justification?
Carnap’s inductive logic, interpreted (as Carnap himself originally interpreted it) 
as providing an analytical appraisal of the degree of confirmation a certain body of 
evidence confers upon a given hypothesis, surely assumes the existence of an internal link 
between justification and truth. But we needn't require that an internal link between 
epistemic justification and truth be necessarily analytical or a priori. What we need to 
require is only that its approximate strength be known to the knowing agent prior to any 
further investigation of the subject. That is to say, the knowing agent must be able to tell, 
on the basis of her evidence and of her background knowledge, approximately how likely 
(that is, how objectively likely) her belief is to be true. So much epistemic access to truth 
is needed if we are to say that an internal link obtains between epistemic justification and 
truth.
It seems apparent to me that any internalist view of knowledge must be committed 
to the existence of an internal link between epistemic justification and truth. For if no 
such internal link obtains, the justifiedness of a belief will provide no epistemic access 
to the beliefs truth, and the satisfaction of the components of the analysans o f ‘S knows 
that p’ will not be epistemically accessible to the cognitive subject. In other terms, if no 
internal link obtains between justification and truth, the cognitive subject will be deprived 
of any access to her own epistemic situation and will be unable to tell whether she 
actually knows what she is justified in believing.
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Personally, I believe that epistemic justification bears no internal relationship to 
truth, and I am perfectly happy with the suggestion that we can never tell whether we 
know those things we justifiedly believe. I see the relationship between justification and 
truth as a contingent one. Taking justification to be an internal matter, I allow for the 
possibility that S could be equally justified in believing p in two evidentially 
indistinguishable (to S) worlds W and W’, p being true in W and false in W \ But then, 
our criteria of justifiedness may be more or less conducive to truth depending on the 
world we happen to live in (and we may not know whether we actually live in W or in 
W*!). This way of looking at the matter of the relationship between justification and truth 
fits in very well with an externalist view of knowledge and an evidence-transcendent 
notion of truth such as correspondence truth (although, as the reader may have begun to 
suspect and as we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, it appears to hamper 
what Feigl called the vindication of the proposed methodological rules). But sometimes 
it appears to creep also into some theories of knowlegde which are officially presented 
as internalist. So I believe that the upholders of internalist theories of knowledge should 
be challenged to be very clear about their view of the relationship between justification 
and truth. I suspect that in many cases they may turn out to be objectively less committed 
to intemalism than they explicitly profess.
Laurence Bonjour is definitely consistent with his own profession of intemalism:
What knowledge requires is epistemic justification. And the distinguishing 
characteristic of this particular species of justification is, I submit, its internal 
relationship to the cognitive goal of truth. A cognitive act is epistemically 
justified, on this conception, only if and to the extent thatjis aimed at this goal - 
which means at a minimum that one accepts only beliefs that there is adequate 
reason to think are true.
(Bonjour 1980, 54)
Bonjour also maintains that epistemic justification must be capable of being shown a 
priori to be adequately truth-conducive (Bonjour 1985, 10). He quotes with approval 
Chisholm’s suggestion that ‘one’s purely intellectual duty is to accept beliefs that are true, 
or likely to be true, and reject beliefs that are false, or likely to be false’ (Bonjour 1980, 
55), which leads him to endorse the thesis that the epistemic justification of a belief must
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confer high probability on the beliefs truth. But is Chisholm equally consistent with his 
own internalist creed?
Chisholm’s conception of justification is surely internalist, as the ten material 
principles which constitute his theory of justification are such that ‘the proper use of them 
at any time will enable us to ascertain the epistemic status of our own beliefs at that time* 
(Chisholm 1989, 62). But then, it turns out that according to his theory of justification 
(which he takes to express the ‘traditional conception of "internal” epistemic 
justification’) ‘there is no logical connection between epistemic justification and truth. A 
belief may be internally justified and yet be false* (Chisholm 1989, 76). But is there at 
least a no/i-logical connection between justification and truth, such that epistemic 
justification may be thought to confer a suitably high degree of probability upon a belief? 
For all my efforts, I haven’t been able to locate in Chisholm’s Theory o f Knowledge any 
explicit admission of the existence of such a connection. To be sure, Chisholm appears 
to endorse the claim that ‘autopsychological’ statements are certain, and thus, one may 
suppose, certainly true (see Chisholm 1989, 22-25). Yet his treatment of epistemic 
justification is officially quite separate from any question of truth: certainty is treated as 
an epistemic notion, and no mention is made of its bearing upon truth. His theory of 
knowledge is really a theory of justification, and no effort is made to explain why 
justification should represent an epistemic virtue with respect to the cognitive goal of the 
search for truth. Chisholm’s epistemology may well give expression to the ‘traditional 
conception of "internal" epistemic justification’, but it can hardly be said to espouse 
anything like the ‘internalist’ conception of knowledge. Indeed, no epistemology allowing 
a substantive cognitive gap to separate justification from truth (or, in a slightly different 
context, corroboration from verisimilitude) can legitimately claim to solve the problem 
addressed by the traditional, internalist theories of knowledge. (That Chisholm’s 
epistemology cannot be seen as solving that problem is also argued, from a different 
perspective, by Goldman 1980, 41-42).
That a substantive cognitive gap may separate justification from truth and yet 
knowledge of the Realist’s world may be possible to human beings is the claim an 
externalist view of knowledge of the sort I am trying to defend is committed to make 
intelligible over against the internalist protests that such a claim cannot be supported 
without giving up any traditional understanding of words like ‘knowledge’ and
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‘rationality’. In the present chapter I have argued that justification is not necessary to 
knowledge. But that is not enough. In the next chapter I shall have to argue that the 
overall picture emerging from an externalist view of knowledge plus an internalist view 
of justification, for any substantive epistemic gap it may open between justification and 
truth, does not preclude an understanding of how it is possible that human beings not only 
have some knowledge of their environment, but also act rationally in order to improve 
that knowledge.
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Chapter 3
Do We Really Need to Know That We Know?
3.1 The KK and Objectivity Principles
Having argued that justification is not necessary to knowledge, I have hinted at the 
possibility of developing a naturalistic notion of knowledge according to which S can be 
said to know that p even if she has no access to her own epistemic situation (recall 
Norman’s example in section 2.5). Endorsement of correspondence truth needn't make 
knowledge impossible, because knowledge is a real factual connection to the world which 
can obtain (or fail to obtain) independently of the subject’s being justified in her beliefs. 
Correspondence truth may be evidence-transcendent, but that doesn’t affect its epistemic 
accessibility, let alone the epistemic accessibility of the Realist’s world. For epistemic 
justification is no longer seen as a requirement for knowledge, and a cognitive subject 
needn’t gain access to the God’s eye point of view in order to lie in a correct factual 
relationship to the world. While an epistemic notion of truth makes knowledge depend 
upon the availability of adequate grounds for belief, an absolutist notion of truth delivers 
knowledge from the domination of evidence.
A consequence of an externalist view of human knowledge is that saying that‘S 
knows that p' comes to be regarded as more similar to saying that *S is six feet tall’ than 
to saying ‘S has a toothache’. Suppose that S is, as a matter of fact, six feet tall. That 
makes the sentence ‘S is six feet tall’ true. But does that warrant S’s utterance of the 
claim, ‘I am six feet tali’? Of course it doesn’t. S can assert that she is six feet tall only 
if she has measured her own height, or had it measured by someone relative. Her r  
sentence is made true by the fact that she is six feet tall, but her statement is unwarranted 
unless she can provide some justification for making it. The same is true if we substitute 
‘S knows that p’ for ‘S is six feet tali’. According to an externalist conception of 
knowledge, the sentence ‘S knows that p’ is made true by S's bearing a specific factual
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connection to the world, but the obtaining of that connection doesn’t warrant S’s claim 
that she knows that p. Norman cannot claim that he knows that the President is in New 
York City, unless he can provide some justification for his statement.
This picture contrasts sharply with the internalist view that possession of 
knowledge entails access to one’s own epistemic situation. There is a widespread belief 
that people cannot be wrong about sentences like T have a toothache’. The mere fact that 
I have a toothache will be taken to warrant the utterance of the claim, ‘I have a 
toothache’. Epistemologists in the Cartesian tradition have often thought that the 
behaviour of sentences like *1 know that p’ resembles more closely that of sentences like 
T have a toothache’ than that of sentences like T am six feet tali’. They think, roughly, 
that if S knows that p, S must be in a position to know that she knows that p. That is to 
say, if S knows that p, she must ipso facto be warranted to claim that she does.
This is how H.A. Prichard formulates the thesis that knowing that p includes 
knowing that one knows that p:
We must recognize that whenever we know something we either do, or at least 
can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it.
(Prichard 1950, 86)
Following Hintikka, Roderick Chisholm refers to this thesis as to ’the KK principle’ 
(Chisholm 1989, 99 f.). However, the KK principle cannot be true, because on any 
internalist or externalist account of knowledge a person can know that p and yet lack the 
very concept of knowledge. Such a person will not understand the meaning of 
propositions like ‘S knows that p’, or ‘S knows that S knows that p’. Assuming, 
reasonably enough, that a proposition cannot be known by a person unless that person 
understands it, someone lacking the concept of knowledge will not know that she knows 
that p (Danto 1967). This is why Chisholm proposes to replace the KK principle with ’the 
objectivity principle’:
The objectivity principle tells us that, if a person knows a given proposition to be 
true, and if he also believes that he knows that propositions to be true, then he 
knows that he knows that proposition to be true.
(Chisholm 1989, 100)
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It is easy to see how acceptance of an internalist analysis of knowledge may lead to a 
commitment to the objectivity principle: if S must have epistemic access to the 
satisfaction of the conditions which must obtain if she is to know that p, then S must be 
able to tell the difference between knowing that p and merely apparently knowing that 
p *
However, neither the KK principle nor the objectivity principle say that a person 
must be able to tell, of any proposition she happens to believe, whether that proposition 
is known by her or not. Both principles are conditionals: ‘If S knows that p, then...'. So 
‘sceptical worlds’ and cases of merely apparent knowledge which are introspecdvely 
indistinguishable from cases of actual knowledge do not count against them. For this 
reason, the KK and objectivity principles have in fact little epistemological relevance. We 
cannot answer the sceptic's challenge - ‘How can you say that you know?' - by replying, 
‘I know that I know!', while pointing to the KK or to the objectivity principle!
On a counterfactual analysis of knowing like that proposed by Nozick, it is a 
factual question whether a person that knows that p also knows that she knows that p. 
However, the real problem is what one does when uttering a claim like ‘I know that I 
know that p \ Even if one can, in certain circumstances, know that one knows that p, 
what does making the claim that one knows that one knows that p amount to?
If S makes the claim that p, she is implicitly committing herself to providing some 
justification for her claim that p (unless she is joking, acting, or involved in other kinds 
of activities in which one can utter a descriptive sentence without making a statement). 
If somebody challenges the truth of S’s claim, S may reply, ‘I know that p '. Saying, ‘I 
know that p’, S may be simply laying open the claim that she has sufficient evidence for 
stating that p, or she may be meaning, say, that she is tracking the truth that p. In both 
cases, she is issuing a promissory note about her ability to justify her claim that p. But 
one can hardly devise any ordinary situation in which S might think it appropriate to say, 
‘I know that I know that p’ - unless, that is, S belongs to the epistemologists’ circle. In 
this latter case, S might be a cognitive optimist trying to convince her sceptical colleague 
of the existence of some actual instances of knowledge: ‘Dear sceptic, you correctly say 
that I merely think that I know that x, y, and z; but look: I do know that I know that p’. 
This is the only situation I can think of in which there is care to utter the sentence ‘I 
know that I know that p’. However, the sceptic won't be satisfied by S's claim that she
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knows that she knows that p unless S can prove that she knows that she knows that p. In 
other words, the sceptic’s challenge arises (as we saw in section 2.4) from adopting the 
strongest internalist notion of knowledge, which has as its consequence that ‘if S cannot 
tell the difference between knowing that p  and merely apparently knowing that p, then 
S does not know that S knows that p ' (Feldman 1981,269). In this sense of knowing, the 
possibility of sceptical worlds, as well as the possibility of less exotic cases of apparent 
knowledge, show that there is no true proposition that we can ever know that we 
know25. But if we retreat to some sense of knowing in which it might be true that there 
are some propositions about the external world that we can know that we know (e.g. 
Nozick's or other externalist senses of knowing), then I can see no situation in which the 
sentence, *1 know that I know that p’, might be put to any practical use26.
In sum: the only thing one may wish to do with the sentence, *1 know that I know 
that p’, could be to provide a refutation of the sceptic’s denial of the possibility of 
(external world) knowledge. But one cannot do that by truly uttering the sentence, *1 
know that I know that p ', because there is no sense in which that sentence can be truly 
uttered that will quite do the job.
3.2 Why Should We Value Internalist Justification?
If the argument developed in the last section is correct, it appears that we can truly say 
that there are some contingent truths about the world that we can know that we know only 
by construing ’knowing’ in an externalist fashion. But if our notion of knowing is such 
that, Q: if  S cannot tell the difference between knowing that p  and merely apparently
25 Perhaps one could argue that indeed there are some sets of propositions that we can know that 
we know, i.e., necessary and sutopsychological truths. However, that won’t contribute to the solution of 
our problem, which has to do with the epistemic accessibility of the Realist’s world.
24 But consider the following conversation: ’I am six feet tall*. ’How do you know?’. ’My daughter 
measured me. So I do know*. ’But she is extremely unreliable’. ’Not in this case. I watched her and she 
was very careful, so I  do know that I  know*. This is a case in which die sentence, ’I know that I know that 
p*, is uttered to reject an objection to a knowledge claim. But note that the objection can be succesfully 
rejected only because it is of a load character. No global objection of a sceptical character could be 
rejected by merely uttering the sentence, ‘I know that I know that p*. One can deny the assertion that we 
live in a sceptical world and therefore cannot know that p by saying, *1 know that I know that p*; but 
denying is not the same as refuting.
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knowing that p, then S does not know that S knows that p , then there is no contingent 
truth about the world that we can ever know that we know. For the sake of brevity, I 
shall write ‘know*’ for any sense of ‘knowing’ that satisfies Q, while I shall write simply 
‘know’ in any other case. Assuming this linguistic convention, I shall say that we can 
never know* that we know some contingent truth about the world (call that the Fallibility 
Principle, or FP). But I take it that FP does not entail that there is no contingent truth 
about the world that we can ever know.
FP may appear to have disruptive consequences for epistemology. If the task of 
a prescriptive epistemology is that of providing cognitive subjects with appropriate 
methodological rules for enhancing their cognitive success, how shall those rules be 
appraised with respect to their cognitive effectiveness if there is no (relevant) p we can 
ever know* that we know? In other terms, how shall we assess whether a given rule is, 
say, truth-conducive, if we can never know* of any singular instance of putative 
knowledge that it is an instance of actual knowledge? This sort of predicament arises 
from the conjunction of an internalist theory of justification with an absolutist notion of 
truth:
The point here is a simple one [...] aren’t some of the propositions you believe 
epistemically rational for you to believe? And wouldn’t whatever it is that makes 
those propositions epistemically rational for you also be present in a world where 
these propositions are regularly false, but where a demon hid this from you by 
making the world from your viewpoint indistinguishable from this world (so that 
what you believed, and what you would believe on reflection, and what you 
seemed to remember, and what you experienced were identical to this world)?
(Foley 1985, 190)
Foley’s definition of reliabilism leads him to believe that this can count as a refutation 
of that doctrine. But from the perspective of the present work, his passage can be taken 
as providing an explanation of why acceptance of an internalist notion of justification will 
give hard time to any upholder of a non-epistemic notion of truth engaging in the activity 
of vindicating methodological rules. For Foley’s passage makes the point that internal 
justification can bear only a contingent relationship to non-epistemic truth.
By adopting an internalist view of epistemic justification, we assume that we can 
tell whether a belief is more or less justified with respect to the concept of justification
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provided by our methodology, but we are forced to conclude that we cannot tell how 
truth-conducive our criteria of justification are, since we cannot know* if the world we 
happen to live in is more similar to what we take to be the actual world or to some kind 
of sceptical world (and note that there may be many stages between those extremes).
Accordingly, for meta-methodological extemalism a methodological rule will be 
vindicated not when it is known* to be truth-conducive, but when it is in fact truth- 
conducive (compare Goldman 1980, 33; the similarity of this doctrine to the externalist 
doctrines of justification cannot go unnoticed).
This gives rise to the kind of difficulty I had in mind when I hinted, in the 
previous chapter, at the challenge of combining an externalist view of knowledge with 
an internalist view of justification without giving up the idea that human beings not only 
can have some knowledge of their environment, but also behave rationally in order to 
increase that knowledge. The fact that there is no (relevant) proposition about the world 
that we can ever know* that we know seems to preclude any possibility of comparing 
competing concepts of epistemic justification with respect to their truth-conduciveness, 
and hence to preclude any possibility of judging any cognitive methodology as a rational 
cognitive methodology. As Larry Laudan puts it:
if we cannot ascertain when a proposed goal state has been achieved and when it 
has not, then we cannot possibly embark on a rationally grounded set of actions 
to achieve or promote that goal. In the absence of a criterion for detecting when 
a goal has been realized, or is coming closer to realization, the goal cannot be 
rationally propounded even if the goal itself is both clearly defined and otherwise 
highly desirable.
(Laudan 1984, 53)
We may tell whether a given belief is justified with respect to the notion of justification 
spelled out by a set S of methodological rules, but it seems as if we are unable to explain 
why S-justifiedness should be regarded as an epistemic virtue a rational belief ought to 
possess. One may be tempted to think that adopting an internalist concept of justification 
which cannot be known* to be truth-conducive is not really different from adopting an 
externalist concept of justification.
(By the way, is it really true that no internalist concept of epistemic justification 
can be combined with an internalist view of the vindication of methodological rules?
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Surely a principle like, 'We should adopt those methodological rules that are known by 
us to be truth-conducive’, will not work. But what happens if we substitute justified belief 
for knowledge*? What happens, that is, if we define the internalist character of the 
vindication of methodological rules by saying that4 We should adopt those methodological 
rules that we justifiedly believe to be truth-conducive’? I am afraid that will not do either, 
because 'what we justifiedly believe’ is exactly what is being defined by adopting a given 
set of methodological rules. And if one attempts to avoid circularity by claiming that 
there can be a hierarchy of different (internalist) concepts of justification (e.g., 
justification! for beliefs and justification for methodological rules), she will merely 
succeed in shifting the problem. For then she will have to explain why justifiedness 
should be regarded as an epistemic virtue a good methodological rule ought to possess, 
and so on ad infinitum).
My claim is that adopting an internalist concept of justification which cannot be 
known* to be truth-conducive is in some relevant respects different from, and preferable 
to, adopting an externalist concept of justification. In section 3.3 I will argue that the 
conjunction of an internalist view of justification with an externalist view of the 
vindication of methodological rules may provide a better account of successful 
argumentative interaction than straightforward appeal to an externalist view of 
justification. And in the subsequent sections I will argue that acceptance of meta- 
methodological extemalism does not bar the possibility of ascribing rationality to the 
cognitive efforts of human beings.
3.3 . Justification and Successful Argumentative Interaction
In section 2.6 we argued that epistemic justification is not essential to knowledge, but to 
knowledge claims. Epistemic justification has its proper place in the activities of 
discussing, evaluating, criticizing, and claiming knowledge. If that is true, and if there 
exist anything like successful27 argumentative interaction between human beings, then 
we need an internal concept of epistemic justification, even if it is conceivable that
27 I take argumentative interaction between human beings to be successful when it leads to 
agreement, not necessarily to truth.
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nobody should ever have cared to develop a prescriptive epistemology and a ‘regulative’ 
notion of justification. In other words, my point is that the existence of successful 
argumentative interaction between human beings cannot be accounted for without the 
introduction of an internalist concept of epistemic justification.
My argument is as follows. Both Mary and John truly believe (indeed, they know) 
that q, that p entails q, that ~>q entails ~>p, and that p provides the best available 
explanation of q. Neither of them thinks that explanations must be true. Yet Mary 
believes that ‘inference to the best explanation’ preserves truth, while John doesn't. So 
Mary believes that p, while John withdraws his judgement. We can further suppose that, 
unknown to Mary (and John), p is not only the best available explanation of q, but the 
only possible explanation of q. So it may be the case that Mary came to believe that p 
by means of a reliable belief-forming process (because in this particular case the best 
available explanation of q happens to be in fact the only possible explanation of q, so that 
the truth-value of q may turn out to be a reliable indicator of the truth-value of p). Under 
such circumstances, we may agree to say that Mary’s belief that p, being the result of a 
reliable belief-forming process, is externally justified. Will that provide Mary with any 
argument to convince John that p? Surely it will not, because Mary and John don’t share 
the same concept of internal justifiedness - Mary believes that inference to the best 
explanation provides justification, while John believes that it doesn’t. But if John did 
believe in the reliability of inference to the best explanation, Mary could indeed convince 
him that p by appealing to an instantiation of that argument.
This example shows that whether a cognitive subject can engage in a successful 
argumentative interaction with another depends (among other things) on whether the two 
subjects happen to have the. same concept (or overlapping concepts) of internal 
justifiedness, that is, on whether they happen to have the same ideas (or overlapping 
ideas) about what can confer justification upon what. The better the match between their 
concepts of internal justifiedness, the higher the chances for a successful argumentative 
interaction to take place. Furthermore, two cognitive subjects who lacked any concept of 
internal justifiedness wouldn’t be able to engage in any form of argumentative interaction, 
because they would lack any argumentative (as opposed to physical and rhetorical) means 
of persuasion.
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Thus it seems to me that the existence of successful argumentative interaction 
between human beings calls for the introduction of an internalist concept of epistemic 
justification, even if that concept is prevented by its very nature from bearing anything 
more than a contingent relationship to (non-epistemic) truth. The fact is that internal 
justification appears to play a relevant explanatory role in a theory of human 
argumentation.
The reason why I prefer to appeal to successful argumentative interaction, rather 
than to the private activity of an individual subject’s evaluating her own beliefs, in order 
to show the explanatory relevance of internal justification is that I take the latter situation 
to be a limiting case of the former. If we had no evidence of the existence of successful 
argumentative interaction between human beings, I think that Wittgensteinian worries 
might prove fatal for an argument purporting to establish the explanatory relevance of 
internal justification on the basis of the invariance of a lonely subject’s criteria of 
cognitive appraisal. Nor might we hope to legitimate our preference for an internalist 
view of justification merely by appealing to its significance for a prescriptive 
epistemology (whose importance and feasibility is far from being generally recognized), 
if the prescriptive function of epistemic justification were not already built into many 
established social practices.
From a slightly different perspective, we may sum up our argument by saying that 
there is a basic sense in which epistemic justification must be internal because its aim is 
not to ‘epistemize’ beliefs (i.e., to change them into knowledge), but to affect 
argumentatively other people’s beliefs in order to bring them into a closer agreement with 
what we take to be reality. And one cannot affect argumentatively other people’s beliefs 
without inducing them to see why a change is being required.
3.4 Styles of Reasoning
Mary and John did not agree, in our example, on whether inference to the best 
explanation should be regarded as truth-preserving. So we can say that they had different 
concepts of epistemic justifiedness (in the sense that some beliefs would count as justified 
on the basis of Mary's criteria of justification but not on the basis of John’s criteria), or
73
that the sets of methodological rules accepted by Mary and John defined different styles 
o f reasoning. Indeed, we could have called our characters Richard Boyd and John Stuart 
Mill, and we would have provided an historical example of the different views 
philosophers can take of the style of scientific reasoning. W.H. Newton-Smith refers to 
the absence of inference to the best explanation in Mill’s list of the methods of science 
as a symptom of the change undergone by scientific methodology with the postulation of 
ever more theoretical items and properties for the explanations of those correlations 
between observables which constituted the main focus of Mill’s methodology (see 
Newton-Smith 1981, 211 f.). I am not particularly keen on inference to the best 
explanation, which I do not see as playing more crucial a role in the methodology of 
contemporary science than it did in the methodology of 17th-century physics (in fact I 
think that inference to the best explanation is simply invalid). But it is true that scientific 
methodology changes through time, giving rise to what I have called different styles o f 
reasoning, and that provides some factual support for our picture of justification and of 
the vindication of methodological principles.
A methodological rule which came to be adopted only relatively recently in 
medical science is that clinical trials are to be performed ’double blind’. Its adoption was 
the consequence of the recognition that patients are subject to the placebo effect and can 
be affected by the therapeutic expectations of people administering drug tests. The 
adoption of this rule clearly makes some difference to what medical beliefs will be 
regarded as epistemically justified by present-day physicians.
The use of sophisticated statistical techniques to test scientific hypotheses is 
another relatively recent development in the methodology of science which has strongly 
affected the style of reasoning of the scientific community.
Non-deterministic theories failing to ascribe sharp values to some of the quantities 
involved in the description of a physical system would have been methodologically 
unacceptable for 18th and 19th century physics. Yet they are now regarded as fully 
acceptable by the style of reasoning of present-day physics, since they play a major role 
in contemporary quantum theory.
The history of science (of post-Galilean science!) is a mine of examples of 
methodological changes affecting the criteria of epistemic justifiedness accepted by the 
scientific community. Saying this, I am not denying the possibility that there might be
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a few very general methodological criteria endorsed by post-Galilean science as a whole, 
or even a few very general principles constitutive of rationality. But it is hardly deniable 
that there have been in fact several local methodological shifts which have progressively 
modified our view of what can be counted as an epistemically justified scientific belief. 
Again, I claim that this fact is consistent with, and to some extent predictable from, our 
epistemological picture of epistemic justification and of the vindication of methodological 
principles. While the existence of several distinguishable styles of reasoning within 
modem science couldn’t even be described without appealing to the notion of internal 
justification, the idea that the vindication of our methodological rules is an external 
matter provides a most appropriate framework for a dynamic view of scientific 
methodology.
With the possible exception of strictly formal rules such as, ‘One should eliminate 
logical contradictions from one’s system of beliefs’, it appears that most methodological 
principles make in fact some substantive assumptions about the world we happen to live 
in. That means, as Larry Laudan puts it, that
the cogency of any methodological principle is, at least in part, hostage to the 
vicissitudes of our future interactions with the natural world. But that is just 
another way of saying that methodologies and theories of knowledge are precisely 
that, theories. Specifically, our methodologically rules represent our best guesses 
about how to put questions to nature and about how to evaluate nature's 
responses. Like any theory, they are in principle defeasible. And like most 
theories, they get modified through the course of time.
(Laudan 1989, 374)
Most of our methodological rules are such that they cannot be vindicated in all possible 
worlds, but only in a small subset of them, the actual world hopefully included. In 
section 2.8 we argued that the relationship between justification and truth can only be a 
contingent one: S could be equally justified (with respect to a set R of methodological 
rules) in believing p in two evidentially indistinguishable (to S) but structurally different 
worlds W and W’, p being true in W and false in W*. Our styles of reasoning may thus 
turn out to be more or less truth-conducive depending on the world we happen to live in. 
By defining her own style of reasoning with reference to R-justifiedness, S is implicitly 
committing herself to the claim that the world she lives in is more similar to W than to
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W \ I believe that all this sits very well with the fact that scientific methodology, rather 
than having being established from within once and for all, changes through time along 
with our beliefs about the nature of our world. We wouldn’t require double blind clinical 
trials if we had not discovered the existence of the placebo effect! Nor would we have 
abandoned the requirement that our physical theories be deterministic had we not come 
across something like Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
This view lays more emphasis on the Tocal' character of most of our 
methodological rules than Alvin Goldman’s own externalist view of the vindication of 
what he calls the ‘total’ optimal DDP [Doxastic Decision Principle] (see Goldman 1980, 
esp. 45 f.). I doubt if there is anything like the total optimal DDP, and furthermore I 
believe that what counts as a good methodological rule is relative not only to the world 
we live in, but to the place we occupy within that world. As Popper wrote,
All we can do is to conjecture that we live in a part of the cosmos where 
conditions for life, and for succeeding with our knowledge enterprise, seem to be 
favourable at the moment. But if we know anything then we also know that almost 
anywhere else in this cosmos conditions for life and for knowledge are highly 
unfavourable, because our cosmology tells us that the world is almost everywhere 
completely empty, and where it is not empty it is almost everywhere too hot.
(Popper 1972, 98)
Popper concludes that we should not hasten to provide an explanation of the apparent 
success of the cognitive enterprise of science, for ‘this strange fact cannot [...] be 
explained without proving too much’ (Popper 1972, 204). If the apparent success of our 
style of reasoning is such a contingent achievement, setting out in search of an internalist 
vindication of the methodological rules of science will indeed represent an attempt at 
explaining too much28!
* As a matter of fact, Popper used die argument from die unlikelihood of knowledge to support 
his criticism of induction, by pointing out that present-day science 'tells us that only under very special and 
improbable conditions can situations arise in which regularities, or instances of regularities, can be 
observed’ (Popper 1972, 29). As an argument against Carnap's project of a purely analytic theory of 
inductive reasoning that will do the job. But Popper’s argument needn't be taken as meaning that there 
cannot be locally reliable methodological rules, although it supports die view that, if our scientific picture 
of the world is approximately correct, we must settle for something less than an internalist vindication of 
our style of reasoning.
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3.5 Internal and External Rationality
On the basis of the epistemological picture I am trying to defend, the cognitive behaviour 
of an individual may be said to be internally or externally rational. I propose to say of 
the cognitive behaviour of an individual that it is internally rational when it displays a 
consistent agreement with a given style of reasoning (e.g., that of the social group the 
individual belongs to). And I propose to say of the cognitive behaviour of an individual 
that it is externally rational when it follows a style of reasoning which is ‘vindicated’ as 
truth-conducive in the individual’s actual environment.
It seems to me that the cognitive behaviour of an individual may be externally 
rational even if the style of reasoning it conforms to wouldn’t be vindicated as truth- 
conducive in all conceivable environments29. Moreover, the manifest (diachronic and 
synchronic) variety of styles of reasoning characteristic of the human species does not 
undermine the possibility that the beliefs of some cognitive subjects adopting a very 
imperfect style of reasoning may nonetheless stand in the correct factual relationship to 
the world and hence constitute true instances of knowledge. For we saw in section 2.7 
that on an externalist understanding of ‘S knows that p’, knowledge may be thought to 
be independent of what any particular subject may be justified in believing. Hence 
knowledge will be a fortiori independent of how generally effective the style of reasoning 
employed by any particular subject may actually be.
Can we know* that our cognitive behaviour is externally rational? Unfortunately 
we cannot. But of course that does not mean that our cognitive behaviour cannot be 
externally rational, if our style of reasoning is adequately truth-conducive in our present 
environment.
But even if it is granted that we cannot know* whether our cognitive behaviour 
is externally rational, no account has yet been given of the fact that people do discuss and 
evaluate methodological rules and styles of reasoning. How can that be if the truth- 
conduciveness of those rules is an external matter? Do those people merely pretend, or 
delude themselves, that they are evaluating the external truth-conduciveness of those 
rules?
79 External rationality does not imply infallibility (i.e., faultless truth-conduciveness in all possible 
environments) any more than internal rationality does.
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In the next section I will examine Alvin Goldman’s answer to these questions, and 
then I shall try to sketch a picture of how the activities of epistemic justification and 
methodological appraisal can contribute to the growth of our knowledge of the world.
3.6 Epistemological Contextualism
According to Alvin Goldman, we do assess the truth-conduciveness of our methodological 
rules (or, as he calls them, DDPs), and while the external character of their vindication 
fails to guarantee epistemic access to the optimal DDP, ‘this fact should not be confused 
with the claim that the optimal DDP is necessarily inaccessible’ (Goldman 1980,45). But 
how do we make our choices among competing DDPs? Goldman’s answer is that if we 
are not to be caught in a infinite regress of DDP choices, the selection of DDPs must 
rest, ultimately, on antecedent doxastic habits:
there are native, or constitutional, doxastic processes that generate beliefs 
independently of our will and independently of the deliberate selection of a DDP. 
Perceptual processes automatically produce representations that, unless inhibited 
by other cognitions, serve as beliefs. Similarly, we are all ground-level 
inductivists. Expectation based on past experience is part of our animal heritage. 
Thus we do have means of forming doxastic attitudes before choosing doxastic 
principles.
(Goldman 1980, 46 f.)
So first comes a set of doxastic habits which generate beliefs through automatic, 
preprogrammed processes. Later on the cognitive subject begins to reflect upon the 
reliability of those processes (which implies the development of a rudimentary notion of 
truth and falsity) and comes to believe that some of them are more reliable than others. 
As a consequence, the creature sets out in search of regulative principles that may enable 
it to maximize the effectiveness of its own cognitive behaviour. But the creature will have 
no other starting point for its search than its actual beliefs. Goldman cites Quine, Popper 
and Peirce (and forgets Neurath) as earlier proponents of the idea that in epistemology 
there is no point of cosmic exile: ‘We have to start, epistemologically speaking, from the 
beliefs we have at a given time’ (Goldman 1980,48). This idea is described by Goldman
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as epistemological 4contextualism’. So this is how we should assess the truth- 
conduciveness of methodological rules:
At first we should (and must) use our constitutional doxastic habits. Once these 
habits generate the choice of a DDP, that DDP should be used (together with the 
habits which it does not wholly displace) to form any new views about the optimal 
DDP.
(Goldman 1980, 48)
I think that Goldman is right and that our methodological judgements should correctly be 
described as ‘contextual’, that is, as originating, ultimately, in the context of an empirical 
cognitive situation involving a whole set of uncritically accepted beliefs and belief- 
forming processes. We have no alternative to developing our concept of epistemic 
justifiedness from the starting point of our present beliefs about what counts as a true 
instance of knowledge and what does not. Of course we have no guarantee that those 
beliefs are in fact true, but this does not make the development and assessment of 
methodological rules a mere game. For it can be rational to develop criteria o f epistemic 
justifiedness (and to follow them in one*s cognitive behaviour) even if  they cannot be 
proved to be truth-conducive.
If our constitutional doxastic habits are not wholly unreliable, our initial epistemic 
situation may involve a number of true beliefs about our environment. Reflection about 
past performances of different belief-forming processes may thus lead to comparative 
judgements about their reliability (e.g.: visual perception is more reliable than divination 
for the purpose of knowing physical truths about material things of ordinary size) and to 
the development of rudimentary methodological rules for successful cognitive behaviour. 
At a more sophisticated level, the appraisal of competing methodologies will rest upon 
the availability of a number of intuitive judgements about some clear-cut cases of ‘good’ 
and ‘bad* science, as well as upon some particular beliefs about the actual structure of 
the world30. Scientific methodologies are built out of particular beliefs about the
*  A detailed version of this view of the assessment of (scientific) methodologies is developed in 
Lakatos 1978, ch.2, esp. 121-136. A summary of Lakatos' view and a comparison with die ‘transcendental’ 
view of epistemological criticism put forward by Popper in his first important epistemological work, Die 
beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie, can be found in Zahar 1984, 150-154. But the ‘theoretical' 
character of our methodological rules is emphasized, as we have seen, by T audan 1989.
79
structure of the world (see section 3.4 above) and appraised with regard to their ability 
to account for our judgements about cases of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ science. If a scientific 
methodology turns out to conform to these judgements, it will provide some guidance for 
the evaluation of further, less clear-cut cases, thus providing useful advice for our 
cognitive practice. The possibility of developing an effective methodology rests on the 
correctness of our ideas of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ science, that is, ultimately, on our being in 
possession of some actual knowledge of the world.
Now, it is true that we don’t know* whether our initial epistemic situation (the set 
of beliefs produced by our constitutive doxastic habits, or the set of our intuitive 
judgements about singular instances of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ science) involves a number of 
significantly true beliefs large enough to set in motion an effective mechanism of 
methodological appraisal. But if it does, engaging in the epistemological appraisal of 
competing methodological rules will increase the external rationality of our cognitive 
behaviour. In other words, if our initial doxastic habits provide us with a suitable set of 
true beliefs about our environment, from which we can derive a suitable set of true 
beliefs about what counts as a true instance of knowledge and what does not, then we 
have everything we need to develop a concept of epistemic justifiedness (i.e., a style of 
reasoning) which is likely to increase the external rationality of our cognitive behaviour. 
We do not know* if that supposition is the case, but we do know that at any rate no set 
of methodological rules can be vindicated from within31. So I claim that it is rational to 
develop criteria of epistemic justifiedness for the conduct of our cognitive behaviour on 
the basis o f our initial doxastic habits and beliefs even though, failing to know* whether 
those habits and beliefs are respectively cognitively effective and true, we know that we 
will never succeed in giving a proof of the truth-conduciveness of those criteria of 
justifiedness we shall eventually come up with. I claim that such course of action is 
rational because it represents in fact the only strategy which will possibly (i.e., under the
31 Endorsement of an epistemic conception of what it is for a sentence to be true or false may seem 
to increase the accessibility of truth, but it cannot give a rationale for our methodological choices. It seems 
to me that the very possibility of appraising the cognitive merits of competing methodologies requires that 
truth be understood independently of any specific set of methodological rules. For if truth is defined 
epistemically in terms of a given methodology, in what sense can one methodology be said to be more 
truth-conducive than any other? Epistemic truth makes the choice between competing methodologies, and 
hence between competing notions of epistemic truth, cognitively quite arbitrary.
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right initial circumstances) succeed in making our cognitive behaviour an externally 
rationed cognitive behaviour.
Let R be {increasingly] externally rational cognitive behaviour; S the development 
of criteria of epistemic justifiedness on the basis of one’s own present epistemic situation; 
and T favourable initial epistemic circumstances. Then the form of my argument is: You 
cannot get R unless you do S under circumstances T; you do not know* whether 
circumstances T actually obtain (so you cannot know* whether you will ever get R); but 
if you want to get R (since it is not impossible that you will), then it is rational for you 
to do S - hoping that circumstances T, unknown* to you, do obtain32.
3.7 The Context-Relativity of Epistemic Justification
In brief, I have argued that acceptance of an internalist view of epistemic justification (1) 
is required to provide an account of the fact of successful argumentative interaction, (2) 
entails, if combined with a non-epistemic notion of truth, an externalist view of the 
vindication of methodological rules. I have further argued that the conjunction of an 
internalist view of epistemic justification with an externalist view of the vindication of 
methodological rules (3) provides a suitable framework for a dynamic view of scientific 
methodology, such as is required by the fact that the style of reasoning of post-Galilean 
science is not static, but evolves along with the change of our scientific picture of the 
world, (4) does not prevent our cognitive behaviour from being externally rational, and 
(5) provides a rationale for the activity of justifying beliefs and evaluating methodological 
rules without assuming that we can get to know* whether our criteria of epistemic 
justifiedness are in fact truth-conducive.
(1) and (2) show that accepting an internalist view of justification and an 
externalist view of the vindication of methodological rules is, under certain 
circumstances, the only epistemological option we can make; (3) shows that the resulting 
picture has independent explanatory virtues; (4) and (5) show that, although preventing
32 Note that 'rational* here refers to means-end rationality, not to the internal rationality of a belief 
which is justified according to the methodological criteria of a given style of reasoning, nor to the external 
rationality of a cognitive behaviour which is in fact truth-conducive.
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us from knowing* whether our cognitive strategies are in fact externally rational, that 
picture enables us to regard the development and assessment of criteria of epistemic 
justification as a rational means to the end of increasing the external rationality of our 
cognitive behaviour.
Having said that epistemic justification is not essential to knowledge but to 
knowledge claims, or in other terms that the aim of epistemic justification is not to 
‘epistemize’ but to affect beliefs, I ought to provide an alternative account of how the 
activity of justifying knowledge claims is carried out and of what exactly it is meant to 
achieve. Unfortunately, I have no well-worked out account of these matters to offer. Here 
are a few very tentative proposals.
I think that any viable theory of the activity of epistemic justification should reject 
the assumption that people justify beliefs, as if internal justification could establish the 
truth of a belief. Strictly speaking, what people can (and do) justify are not beliefs, but 
knowledge claims. Knowledge claims can be justified because they are not sentences (or 
propositions) but linguistic acts performed in real, interpersonal contexts.
When I produce to my Italian friend Marco, who is happily ignorant of British 
politics, a recent copy of ‘The Times* in order to justify my claim that Mr. Lamont, 
rather than Mrs. Thatcher, is the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, I am not trying 
to establish the truth of the sentence ‘Mr. Lamont is the present Chancellor of the 
Exchequer*; I am really trying to appeal to Marco’s belief that ‘The Times* is a reliable 
source on British affairs to convince him of the truth of my claim. Alternatively, I could 
attempt to persuade him by producing a copy of ‘The Guardian*, but since my friend 
Marco has never heard of any reliable British newspaper but ‘The Times’, and 
furthermore suspects that ‘The Guardian’ could be a satirical paper, I would fail to justify 
my claim that Mr. Lamont is the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. ‘The Guardian* 
might succeed in convincing Ilaria, who read it when she was in Britain last summer, but 
surely will not convince Marco.
According to our example, the epistemic justification of knowledge claims appears 
to be context-relative. The beliefs of the person to whom the justification is addressed 
appear to determine what can count as a justification of a knowledge claim in a given 
context. If the aim of epistemic justification is not to epistemize but to affect beliefs, I 
surmise that the kind of epistemic justification one commits oneself to provide to one’s
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audience when uttering the claim that p is precisely this kind of context-relative epistemic 
justification. Asserting that p does not commit one to establishing the truth that p (which 
is, generally speaking, impossible), but to providing arguments that may persuade one’s 
audience to believe that p. According to this notion of justification, a knowledge claim 
(unlike a belief or a sentence) can indeed be justified, but only relative to a certain 
context (i.e., relative to the beliefs and style of reasoning of a certain audience).
I shall say that S is justified in making the claim that p in context C iff S can 
persuade argumentatively every subject in C to believe that p. Whether S can induce 
argumentatively every subject in C to believe that p crucially depends on the style of 
reasoning of the subjects in C and on the evidence they have access to. If both S and Q 
believe that private revelations provide epistemic justification, but Q has not received the 
private revelation that justifies S’s belief that p and is not willing to accept S’s word for 
the fact that she has, surely S will not be able to persuade Q that p33!
The point I believe should be emphasized is that within the present framework the 
recognition of the context-reladvity of epistemic justification need not support any 
relativistic argument against the possibility that human beings may have developed a 
context-independent knowledge of the world.
Widespread agreement among members of the scientific community and 
remarkably successful technological breakthroughs are often taken (by ‘scientific realists’)
33 The methodology of scientific knowledge is probably our best shot at the de-contextualization of 
epistemic justification. We recognized in section 2.1 that any knowledge claim involves a claim to inter- 
subjective validity. The larger the context in which S is capable of justifying her assertion that p, the closer 
S can come to vindicating the claim to inter-subjective validity implicit in her assertion. Scientific 
methodology sets severe constraints upon the accessibility of scientific evidence, so that the context of 
validity of scientific justification may coincide with the context in which the standards of scientific 
methodology are actually accepted. Scientific evidence must be public and open to inter-subjective testing. 
Revelations, feelings of conviction, intuitions, and other private psychological states do not qualify as 
scientific evidence, because only a few priviliged individuals can have access to them. Access to scientific 
evidence must be granted, in principle, to any member of the scientific community. In this way, the only 
constraint on the possibility of carrying out scientific justification is connected with the acceptance of the 
scientific style of reasoning, because the universal accessibility of the relevant evidence is built into the very 
definition of ‘scientific’ evidence.
Karl Popper laid much emphasis on this point (see Popper 1959, section 8), ending up endorsing 
a conventionalist view of the acceptance of the basic statements of science (see Popper 1959, 106). If the 
goal of epistemic justification is to epistemize beliefs, Popper’s conventionalism on basic statements may 
seem to have disruptive consequences for his falsificationist methodology (how can a decision refute a 
theory?). But if the goal of epistemic justification is to affect beliefs, it may be perfectly rational to rest the 
outcome of a discussion on a previous agreement about a few shared beliefs. Furthermore, if those shared 
beliefs happen to be true, the outcome of the discussion may be not merely consensus, but truth.
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to provide evidence for the effectiveness of the methods and the approximate truth of the 
theories of ‘mature’ sciences. I have no settled opinion about this matter, but I do think 
that we should not require that our theory of epistemic justification explain the fact (if 
indeed it is a fact!) that ‘mature* sciences provide an (approximately) correct picture of 
the world and that scientific inquiry represents an instance of (externally) rational 
cognitive behaviour.
The character of our epistemic access to our own epistemic situation is such that 
we can only hope that the epistemic engine of justification may have geared with the 
actual structure of our environment and set in motion an effective mechanism of 
knowledge acquisition, rather than be merely running idle while producing groundless 
consensus.
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Conclusion
Is Fallibilism Merely Scepticism in Disguise?
I am under no illusions that the arguments developed in chapters 2 and 3 will necessarily 
have succeeded in convincing the critical reader of the attractions of a Realism without 
a God’s eye view.
After all, renouncing the epistemic accessibility of the God’s eye point of view 
while keeping the correspondence theory of truth has a few quite unattractive 
consequences as far as our knowledge of the ’external’ world is concerned. First, it 
forces one to give up any hope of cognitive certainty. Second, it forces one to admit that 
one Can never know* that one knows that p. Third, it precludes any possibility of 
knowing*, of any given set of methodological rules, that it is in fact truth-conducive. If 
this is what a Realism without a God’s eye view amounts to, no wonder that someone 
will feel inclined to dismiss it as nothing more than a clumsily disguised form of 
scepticism.
Granted, this Realism without a God’s eye view does not provide a refutation of 
the sceptic’s arguments. The sceptic is right when she claims that no belief can ever be 
known for sure to represent a true instance of knowledge. This is why our Realism 
without a God’s eye view is a form of fallibilism. But commitment to fallibilism is not 
commitment to scepticism. For our view does prevent the sceptic from drawing two of 
her favourite conclusions, namely (1) that there is nothing one can ever know, and (2) 
that no cognitive strategy can be more rational than any other.
The first conclusion is avoided by naturalizing the concept of knowledge. The 
second by adopting a contextual view of the vindication of methodological rules. 
Following one style of reasoning may be more truth-conducive than following another 
one. But even if we grant to the sceptic that we shall never be able to know* that one
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style of reasoning is in fact more truth-conducive than another, we can nevertheless show 
her that it is rational to adopt the style of reasoning which fits in best with (what we 
assume to be) our present knowledge of the world. If methodologies were purely 
prescriptive, the sceptic could legitimately maintain that no methodological choice could 
be more rational than another. But we saw that methodologies incorporate substantive 
assumptions about the world and our knowledge of it. This provides a basis to, or at least 
sets constraints on, their prescriptions. If we got those assumptions right in the first 
place, the ensuing methodologies will provide some effective guidance for our future 
cognitive activity. So it is rational to adopt that style of reasoning which fits in best with 
our present beliefs about the world, hoping that these beliefs incorporate some actual 
knowledge of the world. If we do know that people are subject to the placebo effect, 
performing double-blind clinical trials will be an effective cognitive strategy. The sceptic 
points out that we cannot know* that we know that people are subject to the placebo 
effect. So what? Does that remark lead to a different methodology? Should it turn out that 
the placebo effect is an experimental artifact, would have it been (means-end) irrational 
to perform double-blind clinical trials? Of course not. For performing double-blind 
clinical trials would still have been the only cognitive strategy which could have enabled 
us to adopt (if the right circumstances had obtained) an externally rational behaviour. In 
our situation (which means in our objective situation, and not from our subjective 
perspective), no alternative course of action could have been more rational than 
performing double-blind clinical trials.
It is wrong to maintain that correspondence truth cannot play any role in our 
epistmology because we can never know* whether we have achieved it or not. 
Correspondence truth acts as an ineliminable regulative idea in our cognitive efforts and 
especially in the development of our styles of reasoning.
I believe that any adequate epistemology should recognize the fact that the 
contents of our beliefs about the world always transcend the evidence that supports them, 
thus making it impossible to provide a conclusive justification of the truth of those 
beliefs. Of course one may try to get round this fact by reinterpreting the contents of our 
beliefs as making claims merely about the world as it appears to us, and not about the 
world as it is in itself. One shall then have a very hard time in explaining how ordinary 
and scientific knowledge of the world can progress. But if the fact that the contents of
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our beliefs typically transcend the evidence that supports them is accepted, as I believe 
it should be accepted, at its face value, I think that the possibility pointed out by the 
sceptic - that the world may be different from how we believe it to be in ways that 
perhaps we cannot even imagine - must be taken seriously, and that any attempt at 
refuting it a priori is doomed to failure. As Thomas Nagel puts it,
sceptical problems arise not from a misunderstanding of the meaning of standard 
knowledge claims, but from their actual content and the attempt to transcend 
ourselves that is involved in the formation of beliefs about the world.
(Nagel 1986, 69)
After all, if the primitive cognitive processes natural selection originally endowed human 
beings with were aimed at increasing the chances or survival of the species, it is hardly 
surprising that no certification procedure was built into those processes. For the 
elimination of sceptical problems surely would have failed to affect positively the fitness 
of the species. And if later on human beings came to apply their cognitive faculties to 
more abstract and speculative tasks, there is no reason why natural selection should have 
endowed them with the capacity of assuring themselves of the good outcome of their 
undertaking.
If the evidence-transcendence of the contents of our beliefs represents the 
necessary outcome of the biological development of our cognitive faculties, I suppose that 
our Realism without a God's eye view could be seen as ascribing to human beings as 
much epistemic access to truth, knowledge and rationality as one can reasonably hope 
for. This is less than is promised by anti-Realism with an epistemic theory of truth34, 
but definitely more than pure and simple scepticism.
34 In the limits of this work, I cannot discuss whether anti-Realism with an epistemic theory of truth 
can be trusted to carry out its promises, which I seriously doubt.
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